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M. R. Goode* Mens Rea in Corpore Reo:
An Exploration of the Rapists'
Charter
I. Context
The issue of rape has long been at the forefront of the feminist
movement. Legal doctrine and legal procedure relevant to rape have
been strongly attacked by a variety of critics.' The most obvious
recent trend has been a movement from the traditional liberal
concern with the protection of the accused from unjustified
conviction, to victim-oriented efforts which are designed to ensure
that the number of guilty offenders who evade responsibility for
rape is reduced as much as possible. 2 The bases of calls for victim
orientation have ranged from the view, most eloquently expressed
by Susan Brownmiller, that the fact of rape is a pattern of conduct
by which all men keep all women in a state of fearful subjection, 3 to
the view that present rape laws, suitable amended, will provide as
much protection from rape as can reasonably be expected.
4
*Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide.
1. See, for example, Chappell, Geis and Geis, eds., Forcible Rape: The Crime,
the Victim, and the Offender (Columbia U.P., 1977); Scutt, ed., Rape Law Reform
(Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980); Le Grand, Rape and Rape Laws:
Sexism in Society and Law (1973), 61 Calif. L. R. 919; Note, Recent Statutory
Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape (1975), 61 Va. L.R. 1500;
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom (1977),
77 Col. L.R. I; Mitra, For she has no right or power to refuse her consent (1979)
Crim. L.R. 558; Schwartz and Clear, Towards a New Law on Rape (1980), 26
Crime and Delinq. 129; Temkin, Towards a Modern Law of Rape (1982), 45 Mod.
L.R. 399; Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in Virginia - A Legislative
History (1982), 68 Va. L.R. 459.
2. Specific reference to this trend is made, for example, in Note, Recent Proposals
in the Criminal Law of Rape: Significant Reform or Semantic Change (1979), 17
Osgoode Hall L.J. 445 at 445, and Kneedler, id. 461.
3. See, for example, Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape
(Simon and Schuster, 1975) at 15. But see also Schwedinger and Schwedinger,
Rape, the Law, and Private Property (1982), 28 Crime and Delinq. 271. See also
French, The Women's Room (Sphere Books, 1977) at 557 ff.
4. See, for example, Toner, The Facts of Rape (second edition, Arrow Books,
1982) at 265; Dahlitz, A Case for Legislative Reversal of The House of Lords
Decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan (W.E.L. 1976); Schwartz
and Clear, supra, note 1.
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The current trends in the argument about rape and the law have
led the radical feminist to an uncomfortable ideology. On the one
hand, she sees that current law, developed in and largely determined
by a male-oriented society, has severe flaws which result in the
unjustified acquittal of accused males. 5 This feeling is grounded in
the female experience, for despite all the moves to render rape laws
sexually neutral, rape remains a crime of violence that is committed
largely by males against females. 6 As a result, the feminist feels
personally victimized when accused males are acquitted on the basis
of facts which, whether they constitute rape in law or not, she feels
ought to lead to his punishment. On the other hand, the radical
feminist is, after all, a radical; she feels uncomfortable about the
efficacy and ideological utility of both the conventional criminal
process and retributivist theory. She is even more uncomfortable
with her strange alliance with those conservative elements of society
whose victim orientation is part of a larger campaign to cure the
"crime problem" by the introduction of more police, more prisons,
harsher punishment, and other retributivist strategies. Fundamen-
tally, the feminist is in the bind of the person who feels like a victim
and yet wishes to deny it. For example, should she who works for
gun control encourage women to carry guns as protection against
rape?
7
The movement for the victim-oriented reform of rape laws has been
complicated by at least three factors. First, it is commonly held that, if
rape is not the most severely under-reported major crime, its efficacy is
certainly badly hampered by the reluctance of victims to report rapes.
This reluctance may be due to a variety of reasons, some of which are
related to the operation of the criminal law and some of which are
related to social and moral pressures.8 Both sets of reasons are unique
to rape. It follows that any reform that is based, at least in part, on
utilitarianism must pay careful attention to the everpresent problem of
under-reporting. 9 Second, the breadth and complexity of the issues has
generalized and dissipated the focus of reform; from the victim's point
5. See, for example, the analysis provided by Le Grand, supra, note I and
Schwedinger and Schwedinger, supra, note 3.
6. By, for example, legislation to remove the restriction of rape to offences
committed by males upon females.
7. See, for example, Blakely, Would You Feel Safer Carrying A Gun? (May,
1982), Ms. at 15. Feminists feel the same ideological schizophrenia about rape and
pornography; see Brownmiller, supra, note 3 at 394-396.
8. See examples cited in the material cited, supra.
9. See, for example, Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 21.
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of view, there is still much that needs to be changed. Attention must be
paid to all aspects of the process - informal police procedures, formal
court procedure, the rules of evidence, doctrinal criminal law, and
sentencing. '°Third, victim orientation essentially involves an attempt
to replace one set of perspectives with another - that is, to set a new
standard of culpability. 1 This may be expressed as a demand for
changes in the definition of rape. For example, it has been claimed that
the establishment of penetration, at present the most obvious
distinction, if indeed there is any, between the concepts of rape and
sexual harassment, should be de-emphasized. The demand for change
may also be expressed in other ways, and one of these, the notion of
requisite culpability, is the main theme of this paper.
The mental element of the crime of rape, which had hitherto
remained obscure, suddenly achieved prominence in 1975. The
immediate cause was the decision of the House of Lords in Morgan. 12
An impetus was the nature of the now famous factual situation, often
described as bizarre, that was involved in the prosecution.'"
Essentially, those accused of rape alleged that, although the victim of
the assault had screamed for help and struggled to get away, they
believed that she consented to have sexual intercourse with them. The
accused and the husband of the victim had been drinking together. The
husband told the accused, or so they alleged, that his wife was "kinky"
and would welcome forcible sexual intercourse with strangers, and
that struggles would only indicate enjoyment. The point before the
House of Lords, and the point of this paper, is a very narrow one. It may
be assumed that, the Crown having established all of the external
requirements of the crime, the accused had committed the actus reus of
rape; that is, the accused had sexual intercourse with another person
who did not, in fact, consent to that act. The accused then said, "I was
unaware that she did not consent." The problem is to determine the
circumstances in which that belief will exculpate the accused. In
Morgan, the trial judge directed the jury as follows:
The prosecution have to prove . . . not merely that he intended to
have intercourse with her but that he intended to have intercourse
10. See the material cited, supra, notes I to 4.
11. This is, again, a common theme. Perhaps a most arresting example is Russell,
The Politics of Rape: The Victim's Perspective (Stein & Day, 1975).
12. [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 8, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, [1975] 2
W.L.R. 913, (H.L.).
13. By, for example, Report of The Advisory Groups on The Law of Rape (The
Heilbron Committee) Comnd. 6352, (1975), para. 26, hereafter referred to as
"Heilbron".
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without her consent. Therefore if the defendant believed or may
have believed that Mrs. Morgan consented to him having sexual
intercourse with her, then there would be no such intent in his mind
and he would not be guilty of the offence of rape, but such a belief
must be honestly held by the defendant in the first place . . . And,
secondly, his belief must be a reasonable belief; such a belief as a
reasonable man would entertain if he applied his mind and thought
about the matter. 14
The House of Lords held that the direction was erroneous. A majority
decided that, if the accused honestly,' 1 5 though mistakenly, believed
that the victim was consenting to the act of intercourse, then the
accused must be acquitted, whether or not his belief was based on
reasonable grounds. 16 The decision attracted a storm of protest, and
there were numerous calls for legislation to reverse it. 17 Many people
thought it outrageous that an accused who had otherwise committed
rape should escape prosecution if he could claim that he believed,
reasonably, that the victim was consenting, however unreasonable
that belief may have been in the circumstances. Lord Simon,
dissenting in Morgan, expressed his sentiment with some force,
saying:
It would hardly seem just to fob off a victim of a savage assault with
such comfort as he could derive from knowing that his injury was
caused by a belief, however absurd, that he was about to attack the
accused. A respectable woman who has been ravished would hardly
feel that she was vindicated by being told that her assailant must go
unpunished because he believed, quite unreasonably, that she was
consenting to sexual intercourse with him. 18
14. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 356.
15. The word "honest" is, of course, a redundancy commonly used as a matter of
emphasis. See, for example, Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law
(Stevens, 1978) at 98.
16. The majority was composed of Lords Hailsham, Cross, and Fraser. Lords
Simon and Edmund Davies dissented. The dissent of Lord Simon is examined,
infra, notes 199-209. The dissent of Lord Edmund Davies is noted, infra, at notes
36-37.
17. See accounts of public reaction in Toner, supra, note 4 at 134-139, who
comments at 137: "After so many years of unjust decisions it was perhaps ironic
that a just decision on rape should tap the vast reservoir of outrage and
indignation." See also Cross, Centenary Reflections on Prince's Case (1975), 91
L.Q.R. 540 at 551-2 and, supra, note 2 at 454. Examples of the reaction at an
academic level include Dahlitz, supra, note 4 and Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and
Rape (1980), 30 U.T.L.J. 75.
18. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 367. Sellers comments acidly and correctly that this
view begs the whole question: Sellers, Mens Rea and the Judicial Approach to
'Bad Excuses" in the CriminalLaw (1978), 41 Mod. L.R. 245 at 247 n. 15.
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This paper concerns the question of whether the decision in Morgan
was, in principle, correct. That seemingly simple question turns out to
involve many other very difficult matters of law and policy.
I. A Preliminary Investigation of Mens Rea and Culpability
It is traditional to analyze a criminal offence in terms of actus reus and
mens rea.1 9 The term "actus reus" is used to refer to the external
elements of a crime, and the actus reus of rape varies from jurisdiction
tojurisdiction. For the sake of argument, it may be described as sexual
intercourse that occurs with another person and without the consent of
that other person. 20 It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with
questions such as whether husbands should be immune from
prosecution for the rape of their wives, 2 1 whether rape should extend to
cases in which consent has been procured by fraud, 2 2 or whether rape
should be redefined as varying degrees of sexual assault. 23 In the cases
under discussion, which include Morgan, let it be assumed that the
actus reus of rape, whatever it may be in the jurisdiction in which it
occurred, has been established against the accused. The term "mens
rea" may be used to refer to any requirement of culpability. It is
exasperatingly fluid and defies definition, 24 Courts and commentators
19. Arguments rage constantly concerning whether or not the distinction is
theoretically defensible, and if so, what form it should take. See, for example,
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Standford U.P., 1968) at 106;
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown, 1978) at 395-400; Howard,
Criminal Law (Law Book Company, fourth ed., 1982), at 9-12. Recent exploration
of marginal cases includes Lynch, The Mental Element In The Actus Reus (1982),
98 L.Q.R. 109 andMiller, [1982]2AIIE.R. 386 (C.A.).
20. R.S.C., 1970, c. C-34, s. 143. Key variations on the basic formula include the
questions of whether or not the definition of the crime of rape should include only
male perpetrators and female victims, and whether the definition should be limited
to genital contact or should include the use of nongenital weapons and the abuse of
nongenital areas.
21. See, for example, Scutt, Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage
Contract (1977), 3 Monash U.L.R. 255; McFayden, Interspousal Rape: The Need
for Law Reform, in Eeckelaar and Katz, eds., Family Violence: An International
and Interdisciplinary Study (Butterworth, 1978) at 196; Sallman, Rape in Marriage
and the South Australian Law, in Scutt, supra, note I at 79; Freeman, But if you
can't rape your wife, whom can you rape? j$1981] Fam. L.Q.L.
22. See, for example, Pomerant, Consent fraudulently obtained in relation to
indecent assault (1967), 2 C.R.N.S. 384; McCann, The Nature and Quality of the
Act: A Re-Evaluation (1968-9), 3 Ott. L.R. 340; Harms (1943), 81 C.C.C.4,
(Sask. C.A.); Papadimitropoulos (1957) 98 C.L.R. 249; Scutt, Fraud and Consent
in Rape: Comprehension of the Nature and Character of the Act and Its Moral
Implications (1975-6), 18 Crim. L.Q. 312.
23. See, for example, Schwartz and Clear, supra, note 1.
24. The classic statement is that of Stephen J. in Tolson (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 168.
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use a variety of terms, variously defined, which either display a fine
disregard of common precision or are precise to the point of
obsession. 25 Since the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Sault Ste. Marie, 26 Canadian criminal offences must fall into one of
three categories. Those categories are:
Category One: offences which require proof by the Crown of some
state of mind of the accused, usually intention, knowledge, or
recklessness;
Category Two: offences which do not require proof of a state of
mind of the accused but which permit the accused to escape if he or
she reasonably believed in a mistaken state of facts which, if true,
would render the behaviour in question innocent, or if he or she took
all reasonable steps to avoid the criminal event;
Category Three: offences which result in a finding of guilt upon
proof that the accused engaged in the prohibited behaviour without
any proof of culpability.
For the sake of convenience, rather than precision, offences which
fall into the first category may be called mens rea offences, those
offences which fall into the second category may be called offences of
strict liability, and those which fall into the third may be called offences
of absolute liability. Such an analysis is too general, for the crucial
enquiry may centre upon any given element of the offence in question.
For example, consider the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse
which provides that every male person who has sexual intercourse with
a female person who is not his wife and who is under the age of fourteen
years is guilty of a serious offence. 27 If random and arbitrary silliness is
25. See, for example, Stuart, The Need to Codify Clear, Realistic and Honest
Measures of Mens Rea and Negligence (1972-3), 15 Crim.L.Q. 160; Treiman,
Recklessness and the Model Penal Code (1982), 9 Am. J. Crim. L. 281 at 284; see
also the gyrations of three judges determined to achieve the same result, all by
different means, in Police v. Creedon, [1976] 1 N.Z.L.R. 571, (C.A.), and the
unreported lament of Nader J. of the Northern Territory Supreme Court, who said
that ". . . if one attempts to define with philosophic precision such basic concepts
as knowledge and belief one quickly descends into a quagmire of semantics losing
touch with reality." Anderson v. Lynch, No. 331 of 1982.
26. [1978]2 S.C.R. 1299, 40 C.C.C.(2d) 353 at 373-374, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 3
C.R. (3d) 30, 21 N.R. 295. The decision was presaged at least as early as Lock
(1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 477, (Ont. C.A.).
27. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 146. Such nonsensical decisions as
Baptiste (1981), 25 C.R. (3d) 252, (B.C.S.C.) reveal that the policy arguments in
favour of such legislative rigidity are, at best, misconceived and, at worst,
inhuman. Better compromises focus upon the more revealing indicators of the
relationship between the male and the ex hypothesi consenting female; see, for
example, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia,
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ignored, such as restriction of the roles of offender and victim to certain
sexes, then it may be said that the offence consists of three criteria of
liability: the act of sexual intercourse, the circumstance of non-marital
status, and the circumstance of the age of the victim. As the Criminal
Code provides that the belief of the accused as to the age of the victim
has no legal relevance, it may be said to be an absolute liability offence
if this element is examined. But suppose that the accused believes that
the female in question is his wife. It is possible that the law will hold
that such a belief will exculpate the person who holds it and it is more
likely if the belief is held tobe reasonable. In short, it is possible for any
given offence to contain elements which fall into any of the three
categories outlined above. 28 Therefore, in any inquiry into the
culpability requirements of a given offence, it is of first importance to
isolate the element in question. Morgan concerned the culpability
requirement of the element of consent. That is hardly surprising, for,
odd cases of mistake concerning such matters as spousal status aside,
the consent element raises the only culpability question of any
importance in the crime of rape. It may be possible to imagine a case in
which an act of sexual intercourse took place, and in which the accused
is able to claim convincingly that he or she did not know that the act of
sexual intercourse was taking place, but that must be a rare case
indeed.29
The usual test for discrimination as to culpability in statutory
offences is some variation on the test adumbrated in Sherras v. De
Rutzen, 30 which, in essence, states that there is a presumption in favour
of the requirement of mens rea 31 but that this presumption may be
rebutted by the properly interpreted effect of the words and the subject
Special Report: Rape And Other Sexual Offences (Mitchell Committee), (S.A.
Govt. Printer, 1976) at 19-22, hereinafter referred to as "Mitchell".
28. See the remarkable decision in McPherson, Farrell and Kajal, [1980] Crim.
L.R. 654. See also Treiman, supra, note 25 at 291-292.
29. See, for example, Pickard, supra, note 17 at 76; Ladue, [196514 C.C.C. 264,
45 C.R. 287, 51 W.W.R. 175, (Y.T.C.A.); Lupien, [1970] 2 C.C.C. 193,
(S.C.C.); Ingram, [1972] Tas. S.R. 250 at 263.
30. [189511 Q.9. 918. Approved inBeaver, [1957] S.C.R. 531, 118 C.C.C. 129,
26 C.R. 193; King, [1962] S.C.R. 746, 38 C.R. 52; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 386; Pierce
Fisheries Ltd., [1971] S.C.R., [1970] 5 C.C.C. 193, 12 C.R.N.S. 272, 12 D.L.R.
(3d) 59 1.
31. Id., at 921-922. The exceptions are:
(a) acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts prohibited under
penalty and in the public interest;
(b) public nuisance;
(c) acts which are a summary mode of enforcing a civil right.
Rape is not one of these exceptions.
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matter of the offence.3 2 That is essentially a specialized variation on
the so-called general mischief rule of interpretation. It is invariably a
matter of expedient inference, and has resulted in a wide variety of
mutually contradictory decisions and comments. 33 It is also clear from
Sherras v. De Rutzen and other traditional sources that crimes defined
at common law fall into category one and require proof of mens rea as to
all elements of the offence in question.
3 4
But in Canada and in many other common law based
jurisdictions, rape has become a statutory offence by codification
and, hence, should be subject to the words and subject matter test.
Moreover, something has been made of the fact that Lord Cross, a
member of the bare majority in Morgan, stated that his decision
may well have been different had the English statute in question said
''sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent" rather than
merely "rape". 35 This is, however, a distinction where there is no
difference. Why should it make any difference whether the same
words define an offence at common law or in a statute? If the
majorities game must be played at this level, what can be made of
the fact that a dissenter, Lord Edmund Davies, found the majority
result correct in principle but felt constrained by his view of
precedent to disagree in the result?3 6 Moreover, even if the game of
what might have been is played, why then pay attention to the
formalities of majorities and the ratio when the proper question is
the point of principle? One Law Lord here or there is hardly the
point unless one subsumes the matter of principle to the forms of
legal authority. Once it is decided that the policy is to be explored,
then common law or statute, majorities or minorities, stand only for
32. There is an extremely impressive array of authority for this proposition. See
Mewett and Manning, Criminal Law (Butterworths, 1978) at 214 ff.
33. See, for example, the particularly trenchant comments of Devlin, Samples of
Law Making (O.U.P., 1962) at 71; Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Doctrine ofMens Rea (1971), 49 Can. B.R. 280 at 315; R. v. Turnbull (1943), 44
S.R. (N.S.W.) 108 at 110.
34. One of the few possible common law exceptions to the rule of mens rea for
common law crimes is seen in R. v. Lemon; R. v. Gay News Ltd., [1979] I All
E.R. 898 (H.L.).
35. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 351-352. The desperate point is made by Pickard,
supra, note 17 at 92, citing also the dissenting judgment of Lambert J.A. in
Pappajohn (1973), 5 C.R. (3d) 193 at 208 (B.C.C.A.). The argument was rejected
- correctly, it is submitted - by Dickson J. on appeal: Pappajohn, cited infra, at
note 45, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 487.
36. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 379: "[H]ad I felt free to do so I would have acceded
to the invitation . . . that we 'should decide that a mistake of a relevant fact is a
defence if the mistake was honest and genuine, even if it was also unreasonable'."
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what they are and not for what they represent.
First principles dictate that the consent element of rape requires
some form of culpability. No one has argued, let alone with
conviction, that absolute liability ought to attach to the matter of
consent. Given the improbability of intercourse by accident, such a
course would convert an extremely serious crime to one with all the
moral content of a parking offence. 37 Consent is the element which
separates a relationship of mutual pleasure from violence and it
exists solely in the minds of the participants. 3 8  Absolute
responsibility as to the element of consent would place its relevance
solely in the mind of the victim, who comprises only one half of the
interaction.3 9 The reactions and perceptions of the other part of the
relationship would become irrelevant. The class of luckless victims
would be randomly expanded. 40 The offences which contain
significant elements of absolute liability are almost invariably
characterized as minor, public welfare, regulatory offences. 4 1 The
law displays a tendency to extend the exceptions to more serious
offences, such as widespread toxic pollution, but it is inconceivable
that the consent element of rape fits the description.
The real argument centres on the difference between the mens rea
category and the strict liability category. In short, the belief of the
accused regarding the victim's consent must be relevant; the only
question is whether it falls into the category known as mens rea. The
answer of the courts has been largely in favour of the mens rea
37. The absolute liability proposition is described by Glanville Williams as "an
extraordinary proposition" (supra, note 15 at 101) and by Chambers J. as reducing
the mental element of rape to "microscopic proportions" (supra, note 29 at 263).
38. See Brownmiller, supra, note 3 at 384, in which it is stated that "rape is the
only form of violent criminal assault in which the physical act accomplished by the
offender . . . is an act which may, under other circumstances, be desirable to the
victim."
39. See Note, supra, note 2 at 456-457 for argument that considerations of sexual
equality and autonomy preclude absolute or, indeed, strict liability.
40. The classic statement is that of the Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v. The
Queen, [1963] A.C. 160 at 174.
41. There is a wealth of authority for this proposition. Some examples are Brett,
Strict Responsibility: Possible Solutions (1974), 34 Mod. L.R. 417; Hutchinson,
Saulte Ste. Marie, Mens Rea and the Halfway House: Public Welfare Offences Get
a Home of Their Own (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 415, esp. at 425-426; Erlinder
Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional
Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law (1981), 9 Am J. Crim. L. 163, esp. at
168-170, 189-190; Warner v. M.P.C., [1969] 2 A.C. 256 at 276, [1968] 2 All
E.R. 356, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1303, 52 Cr. App. R. 373; Saulte Ste. Marie, 40
C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 362-363.
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classification and against the requirement of reasonableness. This
view, known as the subjectivist view, has prevailed in England,
42
South Australia, 43 Victoria, 44 and, of course, in Canada. 45 The
requirement of reasonableness has prevailed in Western Australia,
46
Tasmania, 47 and New South Wales, 48 but the latter state
subsequently accepted the English decision in Morgan.49 This paper
concerns whether or not that majority is right in principle.
III. Variations on the Meaning of Culpability
(a) The Objectivist Position
(i) General History
The point of the objectivist position is that, in cases where the
accused is found to have had sexual intercourse with another person
without the consent of that other person but where he alleges that he
believed the other person to be consenting, the belief must be
reasonable if it is to exculpate the accused. In short, the argument
holds that the element of consent attracts strict liability.
Naturally enough, attention has been focused almost entirely
upon the external, objective character of the requirement of
reasonableness, and upon the proposition that an accused who
believes that the other person is consenting will, nonetheless, be
convicted if a reasonable person would have known that the other
person did not consent. With regard to the historical development of
the standards of culpability, strict liability arose as a response to the
inflexible choice imposed by the other two categories (mens rea and
absolute liability offences) on the interpretation of statutory
offences. Once it had been decided that some of the burgeoning
42. Morgan, supra, note 12, confirmed by the Heilbron Committee, supra, note
13, and then by legislation: Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976 c. 82.
43. R. v. Brown (1975), 10 S.A.S.R. 139, confirmed by the Mitchell Committee,
supra, note 27 and then by legislation: Criminal Law Consolidation Act
Amendment Act, No. 83 of 176.
44. R. v Hornbuckle, [1945] V.L.R. 281; R. v. Flannery, [19691 V.R. 31; R. v.
Maes, [1975] V.R. 541.
45. Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, I11
D.L.R. (3d) 1, 14 C.R. (3d) 243, [1980] 4 W.W.R. 387, 32 N.R. 104.
46. Attorney-General's Reference No. 1, [1979] W.A.R. 45.
47. R. v. Snow, [1962] Tas. S.R. 271; R. v. Bell, [1972] Tas. S.R. 127; R. v.
Ingram, supra, note 29.
48. R. v. Sperotto, [1970] 1 N.S.W.R. 502, 71 S.R. (N.S.W.) 334. See also
Bourke (1970) 91 W.N. 793.
49. R. v. McEwan, [1979] 2 N.S.W. L.R. 926, and Crimes (Sexual Assault)
Amendment Act, No. 42 of 1981.
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regulatory offences of the nineteenth century imposed criminal
responsibility without any reference to culpability, courts were
faced with a choice between the full and arguably onerous panoply
of common law mens rea or the guilt of the accused without regard
for whether or not that person knew or should have known that what
he or she was doing was wrong. 50 There was some early
experimentation with a compromise standard, notably in bigamy
cases, 51 but the effort to compromise first flowered in the Australian
High Court. 52 In Proudman v. Dayman, Dixon J. held that some
statutes imposed neither absolute liability nor mens rea. These
intermediate cases permitted the accused to escape if he or she
showed an honest and reasonable belief which, if truly held, would
have rendered the behaviour of the accused innocent. 53 This
compromise differed from the common law idea of mens rea in
three ways: the mistake had to be reasonable; it had to, in fact, be a
mistake (that is, the accused must have adverted to the matter at
issue); and some burden of proof was placed upon the accused.
(ii) The Burden of Proof
While Canadian law had to wait for Sault Ste. Marie,5 4 Australian
case law, subsequent to the first attempts at a defence of mistake,
developed the interpretation of the differences listed above. So far
as the burden of proof was concerned, it was assumed for many
years that the accused must show the defence of reasonable mistake
50. See, for example, the early decisions in R. v. Woodrow (1846), 15 M. & W.
404, 153 E.R. 907; R. v. Stephens (1866), L.R. I Q.B. 702; Cundy v. LeCoq
(1884), 13 Q.B.D. 207.
51. Notably Tolson, supra, note 24; Thomas (1937), 59 C.L.R. 279; King, [1946]
1 Q.B. 285; Gould, [1968] 2 Q.B. 65. See also, on the general principle, Saulte
Ste. Marie, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 364-365. The general pattern qua bigamy was
also present in the United States. An example is Commonwealth v. Mash (1844), 7
Metc. 472, (Mass.).
52. Notable early examples are Maher v. Musson (1934), 52 C.L.R. 100; Thomas,
ibid; Proudman v. Dayman (1941), 67 C.L.R. 536; Reynhoudt (1962), 107 C.L.R.
381. There is a vast literature on these developments. Classic examples are Sayre,
Public Welfare Offences (1933), 33 Col. L.R. 55; Howard, Strict Responsibility in
the High Court of Australia (1960), 76 L.Q.R. 547; Perkins, Civil Offense (1952),
100 U. Pa. L.R. 832. See also the excellent contributions by Hutchinson, supra,
note 41 and Brett, supra, note 41.
53. Proudman v. Dayman, id. at 538, 541.
54. Earlier Canadian decisions of a representative nature are discussed by Mewett
and Manning, supra, note 32 at 132-135, and in Saulte Ste. Marie, 40 C.C.C. (2d)
353 at 367-373.
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on the balance of probabilities. 55 The House of Lords refused to
adopt the compromise as a matter of principle because it felt
constrained by the "golden thread" of Woolmington to hold that the
burden of proof in criminal cases must rest upon the Crown, 56 and,
as a result, it invented compromise solutions of its own in such
cases as Warner. These individual compromises are distinguished
by their incomprehensibility. 57 In 1973, the Supreme Court of
South Australia reviewed the state of the art, and held by a majority
that the burden on the accused was merely to bring forward
sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt on the matter.
58
Thereafter, the burden shifted to the Crown to negate the defence
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the South Australian position
has received some support in the High Court,5 9 the issue of the
burden of proof is still in a state of flux.
The position in Canada would appear to be that the defendant bears
the onus on the balance of probabilities; if the matter is evenly
balanced, the accused will be convicted. 6 0 It is probable that this result
is based, at least in part, upon a lack of information as to the current
Australian position. 61 In the present context, it is also vital to
55. See, for example, conflict between Professors Brett and Howard, supra, note
41; Howard, supra, note 52, and Howard, Strict Responsibility (Sweet and
Maxwell, 1963) at 105-109. See also R. v. Strawbridge, [1970] N.Z.L.R. 909;
Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132; Kidd v. Reeves, [1972] V.R. 563
56. Sweet v. Parsley, ibid. See also Lim Chin Aik, supra, note 40, and Warner,
supra, note 41.
57. See, for example, Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (third ed. Butterworths,
1973), at 72-73; Note, [1972] Crim. L.R. 780; Gibson v. Arnold (1976), 10
A.L.R. 509 at 517: "Warner . . . was cited to me by both counsel, and each found
something in one at least of the speeches in that case to support his argument. It is
difficult to extract a simple ratio from the speeches..."
58. Mayer v. Marchant (1973), 5 S.A.S.R. 567-571, (Bray C.J.):
The argument to the contrary, it seems to me, is largely based on consideration
of policy, because it is said, the facts in most cases are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant . . . but with respect to those who take this view, I
think there are two answers to that. One is that those policy considerations are
largely answered by leaving the evidential onus on the defendant, but the
strongest answer is, in my view, that the logic of Woolmington's Case is
compelling and I for one would be loath to tarnish the golden thread.
59. Holt v. Cameron (1979), 27 A.L.R. 311, (H.C.) affirming (1979), 22
S.A.S.R. 321. See also Franklin v. Stacey (1981), 27 S.A.S.R. 490.
60. See Saulte Ste. Marie, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 367, 373-374; Hutchinson,
supra, note 41 at 434-437. An earlier example is Preshaw, Lutz, Leblanc and Ball
(1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 456, (Ont. P.C.). This is also the position in Australian
Code states. An example is Ingram, supra, note 29 at 251, 259, 261-262.
61. See, for example, Hutchinson,id., at 435 n. 108.
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remember two points. First, those who advocate placing the civil
burden on the accused to make out the defence generally assume that
the discussion concerns regulatory, administrative, or public welfare
offences of a comparatively minor nature, rather than a major crime
punishable by imprisonment for life. 6 2 Second, if the burden is on the
accused to make out the defence on the balance of probabilities, it
follows that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the jury must find
against the accused. However, if this is thought to be an objection to the
objectivist position on consent, it could be overcome by the legislation
which would be necessary to reverse the current Canadian position on
the issue of substance.
(iii) Mistake and Ignorance
Subjective mens rea is absent if the accused did not possess the required
mental state, whether that lack was due to mere ignorance or to the
accused adverting to the point at issue and reaching a conscious, but
incorrect, decision. The development of the defence of mistake in
Australia was conditioned by the facts of Proudman v. Dayman itself,
in which the accused was eventually convicted because she had not
adverted to the matter at issue at all. In short, she had not formed a
mistaken belief; she was merely ignorant. 63 Hence, the law on the
defence of reasonable mistake developed with the requirement that the
mistaken belief of the accused must have been formed as a
consequence of advertence to the fact at issue. If the accused had not
thought about the matter at all, then the defence was not made out. 6 4 As
a matter of policy, the point of the distinction was the penalization of
the failure to advert to criteria of liability. However, the distinction
between mistake and ignorance, if there is one, contains many
difficulties. In the first place, it requires the tribunal of fact to
distinguish between the person who simply did not think about the
62. Again, there is a mass of authority for this proposition. Perhaps the clearest
example is Hutchinson, id., at 434, in which it is said that "it is difficult to imagine
that Viscount Sankey intended or even put his mind to considering whether such a
rule would apply to basically regulatory offences." See also Saulte Ste. Marie, 40
C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 366-367.
63. Proudman v. Dayman, supra, note 52 at 538, 541.
64. See Howard, supra, note 55 at 89-92; Hall, Principles of Criminal Law (Bobbs
Merrill, 1947), at 334 ff; Brett, supra, note 41 at 435. Maher v. Musson, supra,
note 52, appears to suggest that simple ignorance will suffice for the defence. See
debate in Pelham v. Harris, [1944] S.A.S.R. 224; Scarth, [1945] Qd. R. 38;
Foster v. Aloni, [1951] V.L.R. 481; Green v. Sergeant, [1951] V.L.R. 500;
Gherashe v. Boase, [1959] V.R. 1.
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matter at all and the person who consciously or subconsciously
assumed the incorrect state of affairs. 65 Howard points out that:
If an inarticulate assumption ranks as simple ignorance, the
difference depends on the extent to which D was conscious of the
assumption he was making. If an inarticulate assumption ranks as a
mistake, the difference depends on the extent to which D was
conscious of anything at all. Either way the difference is only a
degree of consciousness. It may be said that although questions of
degree are unavoidable in law, they should not be introduced
without good reason because they inevitably bring with them an
element of arbitrariness in making decisions; and that for this reason
also the defence of reasonable mistake of fact should be inclusive of
reasonable simple ignorance.
66
This matter is of some importance in the present context, for, as shall
be seen below 67, those who would overturn Morgan favour a
requirement ofadvertence on the part of an accused who would escape.
They argue that there are "good reasons" for its use in this area. But a
good reason may not be persuasive enough, for, in the second place,
the distinction between mistake and ignorance is arbitrary in that, if it
means anything at all, it cuts across the policies inherent in the
punishment of unreasonable behaviour. Either it is always
unreasonable to fail to advert to the question, in which case the
requirement of mistake adds nothing to the requirement of
reasonableness, or it is the case that one may act reasonably in failing to
advert to the question, in which case the requirement of mistake will
result in the conviction of an accused who, ex hypothesi, has acted
reasonably. The point was made by Bray C.J. of the South Australian
Supreme Court inKain & Shelton Pty. Ltd. v. McDonald, when he said
that:
Speaking solely for myself, I fail to see why a man who has never
directed his mind to a particular question should necessarily be more
blameworthy than one who has done so but came to an erroneous
conclusion due to a mistake of fact. In either case there may or may
not be blameworthiness. A man may be unreasonable in arriving at a
mistaken conclusion; he may not be unreasonable in not thinking
about the matter at all.
68
65. See, for example, the comprehensive and thoughtful analysis by Fisse,
Probability and the Proudman v. Dayman Defence of Reasonable Mistaken Belief
(1974), 9 M.U.L.R. 477 at 505ff.
66. Howard, supra, note 19 at 367.
67. Infra, notes 76, 136-147, 158ff.
68. (1971), I S.A.S.R. 39 at 45.
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Preference for the overriding test of culpability by reason-
ableness, and hostility to the artificiality of the distinction between
mistake and ignorance, led the Supreme Court of South Australia to
restrict the operation of the latter criterion in the subsequent decision of
Mayer v. Marchant. 19 In essence, the accused was charged with being
the owner of an overloaded tanker, contrary to the provisions of the
Road Traffic Act. His tanker was overloaded with distillate, and his
explanation for the excess weight was that the distillate supplied was of
an abnormally high density, of which the accused had no knowledge
and which he had no reason to suspect. Some eighteen months
previously, a series of weighbridge checks made of various distillates
had established that 6400 gallons of distillate would produce a weight
within a few hundredweight of the statutory limit. As the accused had
loaded 6400 gallons on subsequent trips, he was aware that this
practice might produce a slight overload, but that a slight excess was
accepted as tolerable by the weighbridge officers. In the end, the
accused was acquitted by a majority which held that the appropriate
applicable defence was "act of a stranger". 70 So far as the defence of
reasonable mistake was concerned, however, the accused could not
satisfy the requirement that, on the facts as he believed them to be, his
acts were" innocent", for even if the distillate had been more normal,
he had run the risk of being slightly over the limit. 7 ' Alternatively, he
had made a mistake of law in believing that the slight excess would be
tolerated. 7 2 Despite these findings, all three members of the court
discussed the requirement of conscious mistake. All else being equal,
would it have mattered that the accused formed no belief as to the
69. Supra, note 58.
70. Id. at 573:
Normally speaking it is a defence to criminal charge . . . to show that the
forbidden act occurred as the result of an act of a stranger, or as the result of
nonhuman activity, over which the defendant had no control and against which
he could not reasonably have been expected to guard.
See also Snell v. Ryan, [1951] S.A.S.R. 59; Norcock v. Bowey, [ 1966] S.A.S.R.
250; Boucher v. G. J. Coles & Co. (1974), 9 S.A.S.R. 495; Flyger v. Auckland
City Council, [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 161; Gonder (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 326,
(Y.T.C.).
71. Mayer v. Marchant, supra, note 58 at 568-569. See also, generally, the mess
created by the Supreme Court of Canada of the same rule in Kundeus, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 272, 37 C.R.N.S. 129,62, D.L.R. (3d) 145, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 276, [1976] 1
W.W.R. 8, 5 N.R. 471, and Note, (1976) 8 Ott. L.R. 91; Weiler, Regina v.
Kundeus: The Saga of Two Ships Passing in the Night (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 457.
72. Id., at 588-589.
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particular load in question if he had, sometime in the past, formed an
exculpatory belief as to loads in general? All three members of the
court held that the general belief sufficed for the specific occasion. For
example, Hogarth J. decided that:
A defendant who wishes to rely on this defence is not required to
advert particularly to the circumstances each time a recurring act
occurs. If he applies his mind on one occasion, and then forms the
honest and reasonable belief that he is not in breach of the law so long
as the same set of circumstances is repeated, then I think that he is
only required to establish a belief that in the particular
instance. . .he honestly and reasonably believed those circums-
tances were being repeated. Thus, if several years ago (the accused)
had honestly and reasonably formed a belief that a particular
gallonage loaded onto his tanker would not result in the vehicle
exceeding the legal limit, then in any case where he permitted the
vehicle to be on the road only when it was so loaded, this would be
sufficient to bring him within the defence.
73
The meaning and limits of this extension of the notion of mistake have
not been further tested by litigation, but they reveal at least judicial
impatience with the arbitrary distinction between mistake and
ignorance when it cuts across the culpability requirement at the heart of
the defence. There is no evidence to date that Canadian courts will pick
up the distinction as a consequence of Sault Ste. Marie. In that case,
Dickson J. emphasized the requirement of reasonableness without
making explicit reference to the distinction between mistake and
ignorance. On the other hand, his opinion is expressed in the language
of positive belief, so the matter is not free from doubt.
7 4
The distinction between mistake and ignorance is emphasized here
because of the prominence that it has been given by proponents of rape
reform. It is argued that all accused must satisfy a duty of reasonable
inquiry as to consent if they are to deny culpability. Moreover, the
distinction has achieved some prominence in the context of the concept
of recklessness, to be discussed below.7 5 The strengths of the
argument for reform may best bejudged in the context of a hypothetical
case.
Suppose that the accused has been living with the victim for ten
years. For the first six years of the arrangement, the sexual relationship
between the two was a happy one. But then the male becomes an odious
73. Id., at 576. See also id, at 570, 588.
74. See, for example, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 373-374. See also the interesting
decision in Preshaw et al, supra, note 60 at 465.
75. Infra, notes 136-147, 158ff.
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drunk. He gets high and demands sexual intercourse nightly. She
consents, not from fear of physical injury, but because she believes that
it is .her duty to do so. She hates the performance and copes by taking
Valium, closing her eyes, and remaining motionless. One night, she
takes too much Valium and passes out, after which he has sexual
intercourse with her. Let us assume that sexual intercourse with an
unconscious woman is intercourse without her consent. Let us assume
further that he made no inquiry. It is really impossible to tell whether he
thought about the matter at all and, since he was very drunk, he cannot
remember if he did. 76 He assumed, he thinks, that she was doing what
she always did. He had no grounds, reasonable or otherwise, to assume
that anything had changed. In this case, is the accused guilty of rape? Is
he "culpable"? Much as one may regret the lack of sexual variety and
enthusiasm in such a relationship, it is hard to see why this accused
should be declared culpable.
Pickard puts the argument for culpability as follows:
Because it is the act of penetration which the offence of rape
prohibits in a given context, a man about to penetrate has his mind
focused necessarily on the legally relevant transaction. He is about
to engage intentionally in the specific act which can itself be
harmful, and whether or not the act is harmful in any particular
instance cannot be determined without reference to the world
outside him. That is sufficient reason to require him, as an initial
matter, to inquire into consent before proceeding. No accused
should be able, therefore, to defend himself successfully against a
rape charge by claiming that he had no belief whatsoever about
consent because he simply did not advert. He must put forward more
than a claim of mere absence of knowledge of non-consent: he must
assert a belief in consent.
77
This seems very persuasive. Yet it contains a number of defects. First,
such a position only makes sense if it is assumed that it is possible for
the average judge to instruct the average jury as to the difference
between mistake and ignorance, without thoroughly confusing the
jury. It is simply not enough for Pickard to posit the distinction - the
difference must be defined for the marginal cases and not just the clear
ones. Second, if it is always unreasonable to make no inquiry, what is
76. See Pike, [1961] Crim. L.R. 114, 547. For the proposition that sexual
intercourse with an unconscious victim is rape, see Mewett and Manning, supra,
note 32 at 417.
77. Pickard, supra, note 17 at 76-77. At 77 n.6, it is stated that "[s]uch complete
inadvertence is extremely difficult to imagine and, to my knowledge, has never
been claimed." That depends upon what one means by inadvertence: see, for
example,McEwan, discussed, infra, at note 185.
464 The Dalhousie Law Journal
added by the requirement of mistake? If, as is more likely, it is admitted
that a failure to advert may be reasonable in some cases, then what is the
justification for overriding the general test of culpability, namely
reasonableness, with another test which operates on another very
inflexible standard of culpability based on unproven assumptions
about the nature of sexual relationships?
(iv) Reasonableness
The essence of the objectivist position is, of course, its emphasis
upon the requirement that, in order to exculpate, any mistaken
belief must be reasonable. As almost every pass-standard law
student knows, the imposition of the requirement of reasonableness
requires the tribunal of fact to measure the behaviour of the accused
against that of the reasonable person. The requirement of the
reasonableness of the mistake is equivalent to that used in the
context of negligence. 78 Although formulations vary, the essence of
the concept was captured by the American Model Penal Code, as
follows:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offence when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 7 9
That reputedly amiable and sober individual, the reasonable man,
has been described in the following way by Glanville Williams.
"Homojuridicus is the ideal man, the moral man, the conscientious
man - not setting the standard so high that life becomes impossible
in ordinary terms, but nevertheless requiring the most careful
consideration to be given, so that harm is avoided and the law
obeyed.' '80
There has been considerable confusion between the concepts of
78. Howard, supra, note 19 at 373. The difference between the consequences of
the application of the criminal law and the application of the law of negligence
results in a stricter standard for the former test, of course.
79. Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, Proposed Official Draft,
1962, 2.02(2) (d).
80. Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 43. Ibid: "... the lawyer's imagining is
the prudent, cautious, circumspect, anxiously calculating paragon who is held up
by the judges as a model of behaviour."
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negligence and recklessness - sometimes called advertent and
inadvertent negligence - in the criminal law of England, Australia,
and Canada. This dispute is crucial, for it determines the boundary
between the objective and the subjective positions. There have been
many causes of confusion and debate, but not the least has been the
fact that the cases which have arisen for high level decisions have
concerned driving offences. These decisions are suspect for general
reasons. 81 The law has always sought to convict those who depart
from the standard of the ordinary prudent driver, and juries have
always resisted because they too drive cars and can envision
themselves in the dock for inadvertence. Although it is not
illustrated by spectacular appellate decisions, the South Australian
experience is instructive. The large rise in motor car ownership and
use after 1945 brought with it the usual story of road tragedy. Where
the dangerous driver caused death, the Crown's practice was to
charge "motor manslaughter" on the basis of criminal negligence
The leading authority was the House of Lords decision in Andrews,
and, despite some ambiguity in that decision, it was taken, probably
correctly, as requiring conviction if the Crown could prove that the
accused caused the death of another human being as the result of the
grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 82 The law, however,
was unworkable. Juries were required for the manslaughter charge,
and yet juries refused to convict. The result was legislation: an
included offence and an offence of causing death by dangerous
driving. 83 The key to the reaction lay in the response of the jury. In
the words of Glanville Williams, "The jury or magistrate apply the
negligence test, roughly speaking, by asking themselves: Was the
defendant a bigger fool than I like to think I should have been in the
same circumstances."
84
81. Hence the notorious controversy over O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R.
804, 128 C.C.C.1, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145, 33 C.R. 293, 33 W.W.R. 360; Mann,
[1966] S.C.R. 238, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 273, 47 C.R. 400, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 1; Binus,
[1966] 2 O.R. 324, [1966] 4 C.C.C., 193, 48 C.R. 279, (C.A.), [1967] S.C.R.
594, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 227, 2 C.R.N.S. 118; Peda, [1969] S.CR. 905, [1969] 4
C.C.C., 245, 7 C.R.N.S. 243, G.D.L.R. (3d) 177. See also Andrews v. D.P.P.,
[1937] A.C. 576; Conventry (1938) 59 C.L.R. 633; Callaghan (1952), 87 C.L.R.
115; Lawrence, [1981] 1 All E.R. 961, (1937), 53 L.Q.R. 380; Burns, An Aspect
of Criminal Negligence (1970), 48 Can. B.R. 47. See also Madigan, [1982] Crim.
L.R. 692.
82. Howard, supra, note 19 at 100-102; Colvin, Recklessness and Criminal
Negligence (1982), 32 U.T.L.J. 345 at 352-353.
83. Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935-1982, s. 14A.
84. Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 49.
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In Canada, similar disputes led appellate courts to confusion and
the position that the jury should be kept uninformed as often as
possible. 85 There are lessons in this for those who would impose the
negligent standard for rape. Negligence is not the simple objective
test which it appears to be, nor would it solve the problem of what
are perceived to be unjustified acquittals. It might, however,
achieve the result of unjustified convictions. Moreover, there is no
point in any analysis of the tortured semantics of the driving cases.
In the present context, it is enough to point out that the reality of the
objective test is not the fine measuring of the behaviour of the
accused against that to be expected of homo juridicus, the
hypothetical reasonable man. Rather, it is the testing of the
behaviour of the accused against that which the jury would expect of
themselves under the same circumstances. The standard of the
reasonable person is nothing more than an excuse behind which to
hide "subjective" judgments concerning what we all would expect
of ourselves. Given that the jury is supposed to represent the
assessment of the community, such a conclusion is hardly surprising
and is, moreover, difficult to attack.
But what the law gives with the one hand, it take away with the
other. It is obvious that the more reasonable the belief of the
accused is, the more likely it is to be believed by others. If the
accused asserts a belief which is utterly unreasonable, then, even
given the meaning of reasonable belief suggested above, it is
possible that he or she will be believed, but unlikely. It follows that,
where the actual belief of the accused is in question, the matter of
reasonableness is but evidence which goes to the jury along with the
evidence offered of the actual belief. On the other hand, where
reasonableness is a legal requirement, the evidence of the actual
belief of the accused may be withdrawn from the jury if the judge
believes that the evidence that the accused entertained a reasonable
belief is insufficient or not for the jury. In short, the requirement of
reasonableness is but a ground upon which the judge is given
additional power to constrain the decision-making powers of the
jury.86 The requirement of reasonableness confers powers of
85. Gordon, Subjective and Objective Mens Rea (1975), 17 Crim. L.Q. 355 at
383: "The solution to the foresight problem is just not to tell the jury about it, but to
rely on them to be able to discriminate between bad driving which is merely
careless, and bad driving which is so bad as to be really criminal." See also Colvin,
supra, note 82 at 355 n.67.
86. See, for example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 85; Brett, supra, note
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decision upon both judge and jury to depart from the facts. The jury
is given the power to impose its standards of behaviour upon the
accused, and the judge is given the power to decide whether or not
the belief of the accused as to consent shall be given to the jury.
None of the proponents of reform of the laws governing rape have
addressed the question of whether these results are either necessary
or desirable. Nevertheless, both are inevitable concomitants of the
decision to impose the requirement of reasonable belief.
(b) The Subjectivist Position
(i) Mens Rea and "Intention"
It is usual for those favouring the subjective view of the current
element in rape to speak in terms of an intention to have sexual
intercourse with another person without the consent of that other
person.8 7 Unfortunately, they do not do so with any consistency; the
careful reader will also find such terms as "knowledge" and
"recklessness" used interchangeable as criteria of subjective
culpability.8 8 The meaning of these terms is and has been the
subject of continuing debate.8 9 They are ephemeral in the sense that
there are no agreed limits to their meaning, nor is there likely to be.
But this is a general problem which is not confined to the issue of
rape. Rather than essay a further contribution to the somewhat
sterile debate over the meaning of such words in general, the ambit
of their meaning in the context of other words serving similar
purposes, specifically in the context of the consent element in rape,
will be examined here.
"Intention" seems to sit between "wilful" and "malicious", on
the one hand, and "knowledge" and "belief", on the other. 90 The
41 at 434; Note also, Rape: Reasonableness and Time (1981), 1 Ox.J.L.S. 432 at
436.
87. See, for example, Brown, supra, note 43; Morgan, supra, note 12;
Pappajohn, supra, note 45.
88. See, for example, Pappajohn, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 488:
[I]ntention as to consent is central to responsibility; a man should only be
punished where he proceeds with an act of violation in the knowledge that
consent is withheld, or in a state of recklessness as to whether willingness is
present. The intention to commit the act of intercourse and to commit that act in
the absence of consent . . . (emphasis added).
89. See, for example, the debate between Buzzard, Intent, [1980] Crim. L.R. 5;
Smith, Intent; A Reply, [1980] Crim. L.R. 14; Duff, Intention, Mens Rea and The
Law Commission Report, 11980] Crim. L.R. 147.
90. See, for example, the judgment of Windeyer J. in lanella v. French (1968),
119 C.L.R. 84 at 105-108, for perceptive discussion of "wilfully".
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differences between "intention", "malice", and "wilfulness"
are obscure. 9 ' It is fortunate that a semantic comparison suffices for
the purposes of the present discussion. Insofar as the concepts of
"malice" and "wilfulness" require proof of something more in the
mind of the accused than does "intention", that extra proof is not
required in order to convict someone of rape. 92 The concepts of
"knowledge" and "belief" are usually regarded as being less
demanding of a conviction than is the concept of "intention", and
this difference is commonly thought to hinge on the idea of
"desire" or "purpose". A person may be said to intend a result
when he or she desires that result to occur or acts with the purpose
of promoting that result. 93 A person does not intend a result,
although he may know or believe that it will occur, if he or she does
not desire that result or does not act with the purpose of its
accomplishment. There is, however, a difference between the
natural meaning of words and concepts, and the meaning of those
words and concepts in the context of the functional purposes of the
criminal law.94 Suppose someone is accused of determining to
sabotage a test plane. He places a bomb on the prototype with the
purpose of destroying it. He knows that the pilot will die in the
explosion, but regards that consequence as an undesirable but
necessary side effect. Suppose further that the pilot dies and that the
accused denies an intention to kill. It may be argued, with some
force, that knowledge by the accused of the virtual/
practical/substantial certainty of the death should suffice as an
intention to kill. 95 Opinions differ, but most agree that such
91. See, for example, R. v. Smith (1976) 32 C.C.C. (2d) 224, (Newf. D.C.); R. v.
Buzzanga & Durocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369, (Ont. C.A.).
92. See Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 87-88.
93. Mewett and Manning, supra, note 32 at 91-96; Glanville Williams, id., at 51;
Howard, supra, note 19 at 348-353; Buzzanga & Durocher, supra, note 91 at 383.
See also, generally, the useful discussion by Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 440, 442
ff.
94. Cf. the dispute between Lord Diplock and Lord Edmund Davies in Caldwell,
[1982] A.C. 341, [198112 W.L.R. 509, [1981] 1 All E.R. 961. See also Fletcher,
supra, note 19 at 702, where he says that "[w]e may not wish to go so far as Coke
in limiting the methods of the law to a trained elite, but it seems equally in error to
go to the opposite extreme . . . and decide difficult cases simply on the basis of
what the ordinary man would call rape."
95. See the generally unproductive debate exemplified by Glanville Williams,
Criminal Law: The General Part (second ed., Stevens, 1961) at 38; Glanville
Williams, supra, note 15 at 64-65; Smith & Hogan, supra, note 57 at 50; Cook,
Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917), 26 Yale L.J. 645; Buzzard,
Smith and Duff, all cited, supra, at note 89; McEwan and Robilliard, Recklessness:
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knowledge may be equated with intention. If that is accepted,
however, then "intention" may be defined not only in terms of
desire or purpose, but also in terms of "mere" foresight, no matter
how certain. Although that foresight may be qualified by such
adjectives as substantial or virtual, the distinction between the
accused's intention and his foresight of the degrees of likelihood








Recklessness? FORESIGHT OF POSSIBILITY
KNOWLEDGE/BELIEF
It is not necessary for present purposes to decide where the
distinctions are to be drawn between the various concepts. It will,
however, be necessary to determine the appropriate criterion of
culpability if the subjective path is to be followed. Those courts
which have taken the subjectivist position have agreed that
recklessness with regard to whether or not the victim was
consenting will suffice as a reason for conviction, in the event that
the victim was not consenting. 97 The meaning of the term
''recklessness" in this context will be discussed below. It is,
however, first necessary to deal with a particular problem posed by
the application of the central concept of intention to the element of
The House of Lords and the criminal law (1981) 1 L.S. 267. See also the opinion of
Rehnquist J. in U.S. v. Bailey (1980), 444 U.S. 394 at 403-410.
96. See, for example, Buzzanga & Durocher, supra, note 91 at 384-385:
[A] person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially certain to
result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose, intends
that consequence. The actor's foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of the
consequence resulting from his conduct compels a conclusion that if he, none
the less, acted so as to produce it, then he decided to bring it about (albeit
regretfully), in order to achieve his ultimate purpose. His intention encompasses
the means as to his ultimate objective.
97. See, for example, Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 352, (Lord Cross); 362,
(Lord Hailsham); and 382, (Lord Fraser). Indeed, Pickard's harsh words about
Pappajohn relate to the meaning of recklessness rather than whether it is an
available criterion of responsibility or not; Pickard, Culpable Mistakes And Rape:
Harsh Words on Pappajohn (1980), 30 U.T.L.J. 415. She does not analyze the
case in question at all as to the evidentiary bar.
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consent. The problem relates to the interrelationship of the central
concept of intention with the defence of honest and reasonable
mistake. Bray C.J., of the South Australian Supreme Court,
formulated the difficulty as follows:
It is sometimes put that mistake negates mens rea. In my opinion,
though it may do so and very often will do so, yet the absence of
mens rea and the existence of a mistaken belief in circumstances
which would make the act innocent are not necessarily identical,
and mens rea may co-exist with the existence of such belief and
hence there may be room for the defence even where mens rea is
an essential element of the crime. To apply that to the case of
rape, a man may intend to have intercourse with a woman
whether she consents or not but still believe, and perhaps
reasonably believe, that she is consenting. In that case there
would be mens rea but the belief may be effective to establish the
defence. 98
This is a startling development. The judge is saying that the accused
may be found to have committed the actus reus of rape, with the
intention to commit rape, and yet escape prosecution because he
believes, on reasonable grounds, that the victim was consenting at
the crucial moment. Such cases undoubtedly may occur, but will, of
course, be extremely rare, and the task of explaining this to the jury
will be difficult. Indeed, it may not be too much to suggest that a
jury will receive this law with such incredulity that they are likely to
ignore it. Nevertheless, the problem as such exposes matters of
deeper significance.
Whether or not Bray C.J. is right is a moot point. It is usual to
regard elements which require proof of mens rea and elements
which attract the defence of reasonable mistake as mutually
exclusive categories. Moreover, it is usual to regard a mistaken
belief that is based on reasonable grounds as being inconsistent with
mens rea; that is, it is thought that with regard to the element of the
offence in question, the accused cannot have the required mens rea
and entertain a reasonable belief at the same time. 99 Further, if the
relevant time is the time at which the act of sexual intercourse took
place, then the pre-existing intention of the accused is, arguably,
only evidence of the state of mind of the accused at the crucial time,
98. Brown, supra, note 43 at 144, affirmed in Wozniak & Pendry (1977), 16
S.A.S.R. 67 at 71. Similar views are expressed by Howard, supra, note 19 at 152,
and by Kitto J. in Reynhoudt, supra, note 52 at 389.
99. Cf. Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 688, 700; Heilbron, supra, note 13 at paras.
53-56; Wozniak & Pendry, id. at 77, (Bright J. dissenting).
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evidence which is negated by proof of the state of reasonable belief
at that time.' 0 0 It is, however, submitted that the solution to the
problem lies in the interaction between the concept of intention and
the application of that concept to the surrounding circumstances of
any given offence. It is relatively easy to understand the speaker
who describes an action or its consequences as intended. The
speaker is describing a desire to do an act, or a desire that a
consequence shall result from an act. But the meaning of intention is
more obscure if one speaks of the circumstances surrounding and
qualifying an action or its results. Smith has described the obscurity
thus:
The existence of the circumstances [may] be either "intended"
or "known". What is the difference? To say that a person
"intends" that something shall be so implies that he proposed to
do or refrain from doing something to make it so; that he has, or
believes he has, some prospect of being able to cause it to exist.
A circumstance is "known" rather than "intended" where its
existence is entirely beyond the control of the parties. If the
parties know that P is fourteen years old they also know that she
will be under the age of sixteen next Friday, when they intend to
take her out of the possession of her father against her will. It
would not be very sensible to say that they "intend" her to be
under sixteen. If, however, being persons who have attained the
age of twenty-one, they agree to commit buggery together and
invite E to be present it might fairly be said that they intend the
circumstance of E's presence . . . E's presence, unlike P's age, is
a fact over which they can exercise some degree of control, and it
is sensible to speak of it as being "intended". 10 '
Hence, it may be postulated that a condition or circumstance is
intended when it is a condition for acting, or where it is under the
control of the actor. On the other hand, a circumstance is known
when the actor foresees its existence to some degree without any
desire that it shall exist. An illustration of this point, which also
demonstrates that circumstances may be thought of as circum-
stances of an offence required by law or circumstances of collateral
fact determinative of legal application, is the case of the plane
100. Wozniak and Pendry, ibid: "I do not think it possible to say of a man who
believes that the woman is consenting that his intention is to have sexual
intercourse with a non-consenting woman. She has, at the time of penetration, the
character of a consenting woman so far as he is concerned . . . it savours of
extreme unreality . . . the realms of Kafka..." Accordingly, note The Necessary
Intent in Rape (1977), 8 Sydney L.R. 196 at 205.
101. Smith, Conspiracy Under The Criminal Law Act (1), [1977] Crim. L.R. 598
at 603.
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saboteur referred to above. 10 2 Duff comments that "his aim is just
'to destroy the plane', and there is no conceptual connection
between that and causing death (he could destroy it safely on the
ground): but surely he intends 'to destroy the plane in flight with
passengers', and thus to kill them, unless it is conceivable that they
should all survive the explosion."'10 3 It follows that, in referring to
circumstances, one must distinguish two kinds of intention: "pure
intention", that is, intention in the sense that something is desired
or controlled, and "constructive intention", in the sense that the
thing is not desired, but is foreseen to some degree.
In the context of rape, it is apparent that it makes little sense to
refer to pure intention with respect to the circumstances of consent.
It is clear that the law seeks to punish those whose intentions would
be frustrated if the woman in question did, in fact, consent to an act
of sexual intercourse, those whose aims are that the woman does not
consent, or those who, if they had the choice, would choose the
partner who does not consent. But the law of rape is not restricted to
that class of persons; it is also there to catch those who have sexual
intercourse intentionally, knowing that the victim does not
consent. 10 4 While deferring for later consideration the extent and
meaning of the concept of knowledge, this is sufficient to dispose of
the anomaly expressed by Bray C.J. The interaction that he
describes between the concept of intention and the defence of
reasonable mistaken belief makes sense only if he is speaking of
pure intention. Ex hypothesi, that cannot be so in cases of rape or,
indeed, in the case of any crime in which the mental element
attributable to a circumstance crucial to liability must be interpreted
in terms other than pure intention, for one cannot simultaneously
102. Supra, notes 95-96.
103. Duff, supra, note 89 at 154, citing the speech of Lord Hailsham in Hyam
[1974] 2 All E.R. 41 at 52.
104. Duff, id., at 151: "[W]e can distinguish a man who intends 'to have
non-consensual intercourse', for whom [the female's] lack of consent is part of his
aim, from one who merely knows that she does not consent; the former is, as the
latter is not, frustrated in his attempt if it turns out that she did consent." As
Professor Smith has pointed out, this distinction poses enormous problems for the
present law on the mental element required for attempted rape: Note, R. v. Pigg,
[1982] Crim. L.R. 446 at 449: "[I]t is difficult to suppose that this element of
purpose has to be applied to all the circumstances and the definition of the offence.
It will hardly ever be part of the defendant's purpose in rape that woman should be
not consenting. He will not consider himself to have failed if, to his surprise, she
welcomes him with open arms. So the law should not require more than, at the
most, that the defendant should know that the woman is not consenting."
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know that the victim is not consenting and yet believe that she is
consenting. 105
It follows that the subjectivist position on the consent element of
rape can be sensibly expressed only in terms of degrees of foresight,
rather than in terms of pure intention. It also follows that the
definitional distinctions between various degrees of foresight must
be decided. There can be no doubt that subjectivist law insists that a
reckless accused is culpable and shall be found guilty of rape. One
example among many is the speech of Lord Hailsham in Morgan, in
which he said that ". . . if the intention of the accused is to have
intercourse nolens volens, that is, recklessly and not caring whether
the victim be a consenting party or not, that is equivalent on
ordinary principles to an intent to do the prohibited act without the
consent of the victim."1 0 6 Hence, the accused shall be culpable if
he or she intends to have sexual intercourse with another person
without their consent, in the sense of desiring that situation;
certainly, the accused shall be culpable if he or she knows that the
other person is not consenting. In addition, the accused shall be
guilty if he or she is reckless as to the consent of that other.
Discussion now turns to the meaning of the notion of
recklessness .107
105. Duff, id. at 154-55:
The rapist who knows that she does not consent intends 'to have non-consensual
intercourse', not just 'to have intercourse' whether or not her lack of consent is
part of his purpose. Since the circumstances are given as the context in which he
acts, whereas the consequences occur only because he acts, we may reasonably
say that he intends his action not just under a description 'X' which picks out the
result at which he aims, but under a description "X in C' which also specifies the
circumstances in which he acts.
The dissent of Wells J., in Brown, supra, note 43, was based on his view that the
mental element in rape should be described in terms of knowledge and recklessness
rather than intention. That view was supported by the Mitchell Committee, supra,
note 27 at 4-8, and by legislation: see, supra, note 43.
106. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 357; see also Lord Cross at 352; Lord
Simon at 365. South Australian judges agree: see Brown, supra, note 43: Wozniak
& Pendry, supra, note 98. While the majority judgement of Mclntrye J. in
Pappajohn, supra, note 45 does not address the issue, Dickson J. is of the clear
opinion that recklessness will suffice: 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 and 488, 493. This view
is commonly shared: see, for example, R. v. P. (1976), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 400 at 407,
(Ont. H.C.). The contrary view is principally espoused by those who, in the
submission of this author, incorrectly classify recklessness as a form of intention.
See, for example, McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95 at 275.
107. See, for example, Stuart, supra, note 25 at 162, and Glanville Williams,
Intention And Recklessness Again (1982), 2 L.S. 189 at 189, where he stated that
"the question of definition, therefore, affects the limits of liability."
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(ii) The Meaning of Recklessness in General
A convenient starting point for the definition of recklessness is
provided by the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute,
in which it is stated that:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offence when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. 10 8
The English Law Commission Working Party proposed the
following definition:
A person is reckless if, (a) knowing that there is a risk that an
event may result from his conduct or that a circumstance may
exist, he takes that risk, and (b) it is unreasonable for him to take
it having regard to the degree and nature of the risk which he
knows to be present. '09
These definitions must be accepted for the purpose of analysis,
for those produced by a variety of courts are less than rigorous. It
may be seen that the concept of recklessness so defined contains two
general elements. First, there is the "objective" assessment of the
nature and degree of the risk as it existed at the relevant time, and
second, there is a "subjective" element regarding the perception,
by the accused, of the nature and existence of the risk."10
(iii) The Nature and Degree of the Risk
As stated by the American Law Institute, the risk must be
"substantial" in degree and "unjustifiable" in nature. These two
adjectives are not conceptually distinct; indeed, they exhibit a
marked tendency to shade into each other." 1 Keeping that
108. Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, Proposed Official Draft
(1962), 2.02 (2)(c).
109. Law Commission Working Party, Paper No. 31 (1970), Propositions 7B, 7C.
See also Law Commission, Report On The Mental Element of Crime, No. 89
(1976).
110. In addition to the works cited below, see also Howard and Elliott, "The
Concept of Recklessness in the Criminal Law", in Morris and Perlman, eds., Law
and Crime: Essays in Honour of Sir John Barry (Gordon and Breach, 1972) at 50;
Duff, Intention, Recklessness and Probable Consequences, [1980] Crim. L.R.
404.
111. See, for example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 73; Howard, supra,
note 19 at 356, on "... the dependence of probability upon justification."
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cautionary note in mind, how substantial must the risk be? The
concept of recklessness was developed initially in the context of
murder. 1 2 There seems to be a general agreement as to the kind of
words that may be used to instruct the jury in murder cases, but
there is less agreement on the meanings of the words that are used,
apparently interchangeably. For example, the Australian murder
cases mandate the use of the words "probable" or "likely".11 3 The
House of Lords in Hyam used the words "likelihood", "probabil-
ity", "high" and "extreme probability", "risk", and "serious
risk"." 4 The Canadian Code appears to be content with the word
"likely" in the context of homicide,"15 but it may be of some
significance that Dickson J. in Leary used the word "probable" in
the context of recklessness as sufficient mens rea for rape. 1 6 There
is no warrant for belief that the courts have intended to distinguish
between "probable" and "likely", even if such a distinction could
be found. There is also no point in any attempt to quantify the risk
referred by the words "probable" and "likely", for the courts are
more interested in the words as descriptions of the parameters of
risk within which a jury may legitimately assign blame than they are
in asking the jury to assess an exact mathematical chance. In
addition, the intricacies of probability theory are inappropriate in
the area between criminal and non-criminal behaviour and, in
particular, the exact degree of risk must be determined by other
factors in any given fact situation, notably by the nature of the risk
concerned."17 The nature of the risk will be considered below. It
suffices at this point to note that the correlation between
"justification" and degree of risk is multi-contoured, so that one
concept overlaps with the other to an extent that precludes the easy
interaction normally presumed.
112. See the development of recklessness at common law in Serne (1887), 16 Cox
C.C. 311 at 314: Stones (1955), 72 W.N. (N.S.W.) 465 at 471: Hallett, [1969]
S.A.S.R. 141; Pemble (1971), 123 C.L.R. 107: Hyman, [1975] A.C. 55: La
Fontaine(1976), 136C.L.R. 62:Solomon, [1980] 1 N.S.W. L.R. 321.
113. Ibid. That is the view of the authors of the Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft
No. 4 (1955) at 125-126; Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 73; Howard, supra,
note 19 at 356.
114. See, generally, Glanville Williams, id., at 214-216; Gordon, supra, note 85
at 381.
115. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 212.
116. Leary, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 34, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 103,
37 C.R.N.S. 60, [1977] 2 W.W.R. 628, 13 N.R. 592.
117. Thorough discussion of the quantification of the degree of risk involved may
be found in Fisse, supra, note 65: Treiman, supra, note 25 at 318ff. Braum,
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If it is assumed for the purposes of the present discussion that the
accused may be found guilty of reckless homicide if he or she
foresaw that death or grievous bodily harm was probable or likely, it
does not necessarily follow that the same formula, suitably
amended, forms the minimum culpability requirement qua the
consent element of rape. Despite the use of the word "probable" by
Dickson J. in Leary, 118 the case of rape concerns a circumstance of
liability and not the consequence which determines liability, 119 and
the interests protected by the two crimes, while analogous, are
different.' 20 However, once it is accepted that recklessness with
regard to the consent of the victim is sufficient to determine criminal
liability for rape, then disputes' 2 ' concerning whether foresight of
the certainty/virtual certainty of the existence of the consent is more
properly described as intention or recklessness are of no
consequence.' 22 The crucial question is whether the line of
minimum culpability is to be drawn at situations in which the
accused has sexual intercourse without consent while being
aware of the probability or likelihood that the victim does not
consent, or whether it is to include those situations where the
accused is aware of the possibility or chance that the victim does not
consent.
Quantitative Analysis and the Law: Probability Theory as a Tool of Evidence in
Criminal Trials [1982] Utah L.R. 41. For the view that quantification is a totally
fruitless exercise, see Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 73, 215-216: Howard,
supra, note 19 at 53-54: and the much quoted dictum of Lord Reid in South
Portland Cement Ltd. v. Cooper, [1974] A.C. 623, [1974] 1 All E.R. 87, [1974] 2
W.L.R. 152 at 160:
Chance probability or likelihood is always a matter of degree. It is rarely
capable of precise assessment. Many different expressions are in common use.
It can be said that the occurrence of a future event is very likely, rather likely,
more probable than not, not unlikely, quite likely, not improbable, more than a
mere possibility, etc. It is neither practicable nor reasonable to draw a line at
extreme-probability.
118. Supra, note 116.
119. See, for example, the distinction drawn by both Duff and Smith in passages
immediately following those quoted in note 103, supra, and Treiman, supra, note
25 at 323: "When speaking of an attendant circumstances we are not dealing with a
concept of risk creation, since the circumstances . . . must already exist..."
120. See Pickard, supra, note 17 at 413, who argues for mens rea standards which
are individual to the crime in question.
121. See, for example: (a) Buzzard, Intent [1978] Crim. L.R. 5; Smith, Intent: A
Reply [1978] Crim. L.R. 14, and (b) McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95;
Glanville Williams, supra, note 107; McEwan and Robilliard, 'Intention and
recklessness again' -a response (1982), 2 L.S. 198.
122. See, for example, R. v. Buzzanga & Durocher, supra, note 91 at 384-385.
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While it is true that the traditional sources discuss the concept of
recklessness, in general, in terms such as "probability",
"likelihood", or "substantial", "serious", or "gross" risk, 123 the
courts in which the question has recently arisen for decision have
decided that the jury is to be directed that, in the case of rape, it is
sufficient for a finding of guilt that the accused realized that the
victim might not have been consenting. In Wozniak and Pendry,
Bray C.J. held that:
Logically, perhaps, mens rea in general and mens rea by
recklessness in particular should be the same concept no matter
what the crime. This, however, is not always so. And there is a
difference, it seems to me, between foresight of the future
consequences of an act about to be committed and belief in a
present state of facts .. .the requirement of a belief in the
probability of non-consent, as opposed to whatever degree of
possibility is involved in the word "might" has never, as far as I
can see, been held to be a necessary ingredient of rape and it is
implicity excluded in all the formulations I have been able to
discover. No doubt fantastic or remote possibilities of non-
consent would not normally enter a man's mind in such a
situation, nor do I think they would be regarded by a jury as fairly
falling within the word "might". And a belief in consent is not
inconsistent with preliminary doubt resolved after
deliberation. 
124
Furthermore, the English Court of Appeal in Pigg held that "on any
view of the word 'reckless' it seems to us that it clearly includes a
case where the man appreciates the possibility that the woman may
not be consenting and, nevertheless, goes on . . ,125 It seems,
therefore, on the basis of existing fragmentary and most casually
reasoned case law, that the accused will be found guilty of rape if,
all other criteria for responsibility being present, he foresaw that the
victim might not be consenting or the possibility that the victim did
not consent, with the proviso that fanciful or remote doubts must be
regarded as excluded. Belief and foresight are always a matter of
fine degree and, with Lords Reid and Hailsham, 126 the use of such
123. Supra, notes 113, 114.
124. Wozniak & Pendry, supra, note 98 at 74. 1 am grateful to my colleague, Mr.
W. B. Fisse, for the following point: "As a matter of policy, it is far from clear
why any material distinction should be drawn between foresight of future
consequences and belief as to present facts; recklessness as to present facts in
murder (as where D, a shooter, is reckless as to an object being an animal or a
human being) now appears to require realization of likelihood or probability."
125. R. v. Pigg, [19821 1 W.L.R. 762 at 769, (C.A.).
126. See, supra, note 117 for reference to the views of Lord Reid, quoted with
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words as "might" and "possible" are as far as it is necessary or
desirable to go in the instruction of a jury. Moreover, whatever
formula is chosen to express to the jury the minimum degree of
foresight of risk required, it must be flexible enough to allow the
jury to take into account its overall assessment of the nature of the
risk concerned. As Glanville Williams pointed out recently, "the
law is interested not only in the degree of probability of the
consequence but in the magnitude of the calamity if it occurs.'
1 27
Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the question of the
degree of the risk involved is wholly swallowed by the assessment
of the justification for running that risk. Smith has remarked that:
If the risk is unjustifiable, that should be enough and it confuses
the issue to go on to inquire whether it is also "substantial", for
that is a matter which will usually have already been taken into
account in deciding whether it was justifiable. Where the conduct
has no social utility whatever, it is submitted that any perceptible
degree of risk is unjustifiable. For example, a bank robber would
not be justified in taking any risk with the lives of innocent
persons in order to achieve his ends, however slight that risk may
be.1 2
8
It is sometimes said that the court should look at all the facets of the
situation in order to balance the social value in taking the risk
against the social harm of the danger inherent in the risk. 129 It is
obvious that the degree of risk is only one part of that equation.'
30
This is usually illustrated by examining variations of a case in which
a doctor operates on a patient with some foresight that the death of
the patient, due to the operation, is possible/probable/virtually
certain, but yet the operation is, to a degree, necessary to preserve
the patient's life/health/ability to play the violin.' 3 ' The flexibility
approval by Lord Hailsham in Hyam, [1974] 2 W.L.R. 607 at 620.
127. Glanville Williams, supra, note 107 at 192. See also Griew, Reckless
Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence [ 1981 ] Crim.
L.R. 743 at 749.
128. See, supra, note 104 at 447. See also Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at
73 and Note, Recklessness and Intoxication in the House of Lords (1981), 32 N.
Ire. L.Q. 373 at 380-381. Colvin, supra, note 82 at 352 states that "[tlhe propriety
of risk-taking has to be assessed by reference to the ends sought. This is true of
recklessness in general. With more closely defined actions, however, it will be an
exceedingly rare case in which justifiability is an issue of any significance." In
short, the two are so conflated that the issue is either degree (Colvin) or
justifiability (Smith).
129. An example is Howard, supra, note 19 at 356-357.
130. Howard, id. at 357.
131. See, for example, Howard, ibid; Stuart, supra, note 25 at 166-167; Gordon,
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of this concededly objective part of the test for recklessness,
depending as it does on so many factors peculiar to the individual
case,1 3 2 is built in so that the letter of the law may not defeat the
execution of socially defensible policy. Despite the fact that the
multifactoral approach precludes more than the most general of
discussions of recklessness as to the consent element of rape, it also
opens up a multi-factoral analysis of particular cases and classes of
cases. All likely situations fall into a class in which sexual
intercourse with another person takes place and almost all of these
cases will involve situations where, because of the spouse
exemption, the sexual intercourse is extramarital. Moreover, the
central case will usually involve a situation where there is
inadequate evidence of the use of force or threats, for, oddities like
the incredible story in Morgan aside, the accused will be hard put to
maintain a defence based on belief in consent if he thought it
necessary to procure it by coercive means.
Examination of the social utility of such behaviour reveals a
crucial ambiguity in the notion of recklessness. Does one examine
the social utility of the behaviour on the facts as the accused
believed them to be, does one examine it on the facts as the ordinary
man would have believed them to be, or does one examine it on the
facts as they turned out to be? In general in the context of rape, the
perspective on which the facts are examined may make a startling
difference; given the options listed above, the examination could be
of the social utility of extramarital sexual intercourse, that act in the
context that the other might not have consented, or rape simpliciter,
respectively. There has not been an answer to this conundrum. ' 3 3 It
is submitted that one cannot simply look to the facts as they were.
Since, by definition, each situation involves the fact that sexual
intercourse occurred without consent, the facts as they were would
supra, note 85 at 388; Trieman, supra, note 25 at 340. Also see, supra, note 104 at
447.
132. See, for example, Stuart, id., 167; Treiman, id., at 335ff; Note, The Reckless
Rape (1976), 18 Crim. L.Q. 418 at 419-420.
133. There has been a wide range of views expressed on this point. The view
which seems prevalent in England is that the assessment of degree and justifiability
should be made objectively but by reference to the perceptions of the actor: see, for
example, Law Commission Report No. 89, supra, note 109 at para. 65, and Griew,
supra, note 127 at 749. Treiman, supra, note 25 at 321-322, vacillates between the
actor's knowledge and what a reasonable person would have known, and at 362ff
argues that degree depends upon the actor's perception, but justifiability does not.
By contrast, Howard, supra, note 19 at 357-360, appears to be of the opinion that
the whole inquiry does not depend on the individual perception of the actor.
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overwhelm the mental element to such a degree that de facto
absolute liability would result. Equally, it would be absurd to rely
simply on the facts as the accused believed them to be, as the
rapist's capacity for self-delusion is unparalleled. 134 Moreover,
discussion of the social utility of extramarital sexual intercourse is
hardly to the point in a case where there is, ex hypothesi, some risk
that rape is involved. 135 Rather, it is submitted that what is required
is that a balance be struck between, on the one hand, an objective
assessment of the risk that the other is not consenting and the harm
of the consequences of non-consent, and on the other hand, an
objective assessment of the social value of the disregard of that risk,
taking into account what an ordinary person in the position of the
accused would have thought.
The fact that consideration of the social harm of having
intercourse with another person without that person's consent has a
place in this proposed balance has led some to ignore the matters of
the risk and the possible social value of its disregard in some
circumstances. The fact that some possibility of intercourse
occurring without the consent of another objectively exists has been
permitted to blot out the nature of the inquiry, and to obscure the
difference between the policy-based flexibility of this arm of
recklessness and the view that the accused must be judged solely
upon the facts as they actually are. A regrettable example occurred
in Leary when Dickson J. stated that:
When the risk is substantial and unjustifiable, proof of
recklessness necessary to constitute the mental element essential
to criminal responsibility may be readily satisfied. This is
exemplified in the crime of rape. The harm to be anticipated from
acting upon the mistaken belief that the woman is consenting is
very great whereas that which may be lost in failing to act is
slight. The risk then is both substantial and unjustifiable. 136
With respect, it is submitted that this passage may be an accurate
description of the majority of cases, but it is unsound. If the
objective element of recklessness so easily concludes the inquiry,
then the subjective element of foresight becomes a formality and the
process becomes indistinguishable from the imposition of absolute
134. See, for example, Clark and Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality
(the women's press, 1977) at 102-103.
135. Though that temptation has proved too much for some. See, infra, notes
139-144, 254ff.
136. Leary, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473 at 486.
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liability. Moreover, the formula dictates that the balance is always
in favour of inquiry because the risk is always great and
unjustifiable. The argument proceeds by its bootstraps and ignores
the variety of possible experience, with the varying risks involved in
them. As Dahlitz has pointed out, the degree and justifiability of
risk may vary widely from the case where the accused entered the
victim's home as an intruding stranger to the case of courtship
where the issues turn on the degree of permitted intimacy.137 In the
former case, the risk is high and unjustifiable, but in the latter, "a
delicate personal assessment is involved which, in the ordinary
course of events, should not be subject to the scrutiny of the
criminal law."13
8
Nevertheless, the result of concentrating upon the nature of the
social harm involved to the exclusion of other matters has led a
number of people to advocate that, in all cases, the male has a duty
to inquire as to consent, and failure to do so should result in a
presumptive finding of recklessness. In Morgan, Lord Cross
remarked that:
There is nothing unreasonable in the law requiring a citizen to
take reasonable care to ascertain the facts relevant to his avoiding
doing a prohibited act. To have intercourse with a woman who is
not your wife is, even today, not generally considered to be a
course of conduct which the law ought positively to encourage
and it can be argued with force that it is only fair to the woman
and not in the least unfair to the man that he should be under a
duty to take reasonable care to ascertain that she is consenting to
the intercourse and be at the risk of prosecution if he fails to take
such care. 13
9
137. Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 19-20.
138. Id., at 20. See similar views expressed in Note, supra, note 132 at 420, and
Note, supra, note 104 at 448. The former states that: "Similarly, sexual intercourse
with a female person may be a risk-creating activity if the circumstances (such as
the consumption of alcohol, a woman picked up at a bus-stop, a husband with a
strange story of his wife's sexual proclivities, or whatever other circumstances the
facts disclose) are such that not to direct one's mind to the risk that she is not
consenting is, in fact, a mens rea sufficient to support a rape conviction."
139. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 352. Contrast the opposite, yet far less
widely repeated, opinion of Lord Fraser at 383, where he states that: "No doubt a
rapist who mistakenly believes that the woman is consenting to intercourse must be
behaving immorally by committing fornication or adultery. But these forms of
immoral conduct are not intended to be struck at by the law against rape; indeed
they are not now considered appropriate to be visited with penalties of the criminal
law at all."
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The most eloquent advocate of an advertence requirement is
Pickard, who says of the accused that:
He is about to engage intentionally in the specific act which can
in itself be harmful and whether or not the act is harmful in any
particular instance cannot be determined without reference to the
world outside him. That is sufficient reason to require him, as an
initial matter, to inquiry into consent before proceeding . ..
There can be no doubt that it is a major harm for a woman to be
subjected to non-consensual intercourse notwithstanding that the
man may believe he has her consent. There can be little doubt
that the cost of taking reasonable care is insignificant compared
with the harm which can be avoided through its exercise; indeed,
the only cost I can identify is the general one of creating some
pressure toward greater explicitness in sexual contexts...
considering the disparate weights of the interests involved, a
failure to inquire carefully into consent constitutes, in my view,
such a lack of minimal concern for the bodily integrity of others
that it is good criminal policy to ground liability on it.
140
The language of deemed or presumptive fault could hardly be more
clear. In fairness to Lord Cross and Pickard, it should be pointed out
that they were speaking of the requirement of advertence in the
context of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake.' 4 1 The
language of both is precisely apposite to the question of presumptive
recklessness, but it is submitted that their arguments are
misconceived. The short answer to them is that, in the past, the law
punished women complainants for their unconventional sexual
lifestyles by refusing to convict those who had attacked them, on the
ground that, because of her lifestyle, the woman had asked for it.
And now we are, apparently, urged to punish men for their
unconventional sexual lifestyles by sending them to prison on the
ground that, because of their lifestyles, which are unconventional
only in the sense that they involve extramarital sexual intercourse,
they were "asking for it". That logic carries its own refutation.
It has already been pointed out that a flat requirement of
advertence cuts across the very question at issue, that is, the
assessment of the culpability of the accused. The assumption upon
which the requirement of advertence is based is that the failure to
inquire renders all who fail sufficiently culpable to ground
responsibility for rape. This assumption ignores the variability of
140. Pickard, supra, note 17 at 76-77.
141. Supra, notes 63-77.
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human behaviour. As Dahlitz points out, the assumption is not true
in all cases.14 2 If the assumption is not true in all cases, then what is
its justification 143 and, if the assumption is true in all cases, what is
the objection to leaving it to the jury? However, Pickard is of the
opinion that human sexual behaviour is not a complex interaction,
as follows:
The safety of driving or construction work depends on myriad
circumstances, any one of which might ultimately turn out to be
relevant, some of which are difficult to ascertain, and most of
which are susceptible to unexpected, instant alteration at any
time. As a result, even an actor who has focused his mind for the
moment on the question of safety cannot be said to have had,
because of that, a meaningful opportunity to avoid harm . . . The
inquiry he must undertake [in the context of rape] is simple; a
single fact has been isolated and declared legally relevant to the
doing of a single, temporally and spatially finite, intentional act.
Consent is a matter of present fact, not of potential future
consequences. There are only two legally relevant possibilities:
consent is given or it is not. There is a discrete method, available
to virtually everyone, of clarifying any ambiguities: actual verbal
inquiry. And the one person who possesses the necessary
information is, after all, right there. In such circumstances, there
can be no unfairness in requiring the actor to inquire into consent
with the degree of care of which he is personally capable.' 44
There are at least two major objections to this line of reasoning.
First, at what point in the transaction must the inquiry be made?
Suppose, as was the case in Mayer v. Marchant, that the accused has
addressed the problem at some time in the past and believes that, so
long as the same circumstances recur, the consent is given. 145 Must he,
instead, inquire on each occasion? When on each occasion? Surely it is
too much to expect a careful inquiry right at the moment of penetration.
But that is the legally relevant moment, and it is the criterion of legal
relevance which Pickard emphasizes. In addition, there is authority for
the proposition that the victim is entitled to change her mind once
142. Supra, notes 137, 138.
143. Treiman, supra, note 25 at 350: "There is a common sense difference
between an ordinary deviation and a gross deviation, which might be best
expressed as being the distinctions among a fool and a damned fool, but essentially
the difference represents a value judgement which cannot be reduced to a legal
formula."
144. Pickard, supra, note 17 at 80-81. Similarly at 83: "In rape, we are dealing
with the kind of mistake that results from the complexity of our endeavours and
inevitable human frailty, but with an easily avoided and self-serving mistake
produced by the actor's indifference to the separate existence of another."
145. Supra, notes 69-76.
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sexual intercourse has begun, especially if more than the initial
penetration occurs. 146 Must the male continue to ask whether the
female consents throughout the entire transaction? The requirement is
absurd. Either one concentrates on the legally relevant moment of
penetration, in which case sexual intercourse must be continually
punctuated by questions and answers, or one concentrates on some
point in the process leading up to the act of intercourse, in which case, if
the female changes her mind, the inquiry is irrelevant anyway.
Equally, why do they not propose a requirement that the female
manifest her consent prior to intercourse? Second, it is surely a strange
view of the sexual relationship between two persons to see that
relationship as being less complex than the act of driving a car. To
impose a requirement of advertence which cut across the basic
requirement of culpability is to ignore the complexities and subtleties
of human sexual interaction. The better view is that expressed by
Toner, as follows:
The exchange of cues between a man and a woman involved in a rape
is undoubtedly significant to the outcome of any subsequent trial.
The closer their prior relationship, the hazier these cues are likely to
be. In the early stages of the encounter, it may well be that the
victim's behaviourcould be interpreted as coyness, mild resistence,
or subdued fear. In this extraordinarily complex and confused
interaction, it is likely that the circumstances and her own
conditioning are likely to limit severely the cues she is able to give,
so much so that her behaviour may later seem mystifyingly
ambivalent. 147
There are important differences between obvious consent, based on a
choice for intercourse, and reluctant tolerance which shades into
146. See Salmon, [1969] S.A.S.R. 76; Mayberry, [1973] Qd. R. 211;Kaitamaki,
[1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 59. The last decision is discussed in Note, supra, note 86 at
438-441.
147. Toner, supra, note 4 at 63; see also id. at 67. See also Note, supra, note 2 at
455, quoting the similar opinion expressed in the Heilbron Report, supra, note 13
at 2; Note, supra, note 86 at 436, quoting Honore, Sex Law (Duckworth, 1978) at
77; and Dickson J. inPappajohn 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 505-506:
Whether . . . [sexual intercourse] . . . is criminal depends on complex consid-
erations, since the mental states of both parties and the influence of each upon
the other, as well as their physical interaction, have to be considered and are
sometimes difficult to interpret - all the more so, since normally the act takes
place in private; there can be many ambiguous situations in sexual relationships;
hence, however precisely the law may be stated, it cannot always adequately
resolve these problems; in the first place, there may well be circumstances
where each party interprets the situation differently, and it may be quite
impossible to determine with any confidence which interpretation is right.
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passive nonconsent, and the way in which those conditions are made
manifest and are perceived by the accused in any given situation are
also significantly different. The presence or absence of consent cannot
be determined by a single verbal inquiry. Those who ignore this view
of sexual relationships do so because their preoccupation with the harm
that is actually caused leads them to a perspective based on absolute
liability, masquerading as presumptive fault of some kind.
The other factor in the recklessness formula is the possible social
value inherent in disregard of the risk found to be present. Most
commentators assume either that there is no such social value, or that it
is so minimal as to be negligible. In most individual cases that will be
so. But that does not elevate a rule of thumb into presumptive
recklessness. Consideration of policy-based, flexible social value
must be grounded in general concerns and not influenced by myopia in
a particular case. For example, it should be clear from the discussion
above that, in any case, attention should be paid to the question of
whether it is sensible, as a general rule, to require all men and all
women in similar circumstances to inquire as to consent, in light of
defensible legal attitudes to extramarital sexual relationships. It may
be the case that it is not defensible social policy or defensible legal
theory to require constant questioning or affirmation of consent during
the act of sexual intercourse.
Pickard is of the opinion that the only cost of a rule of inquiry is the
creation of a pressure toward greater explicitness in sexual
relationships. 148 Lord Cross is of the opinion that such a rule would
reflect social disapproval of extramarital sex and, hence, would
discourage it. For what it is worth, I think that Lord Cross is right. The
cost of such a policy, designed to create honest sexual relationships,
would be the stifling of a form of human interaction that is not
sanctioned by the formalistic blessings of the churches or the state. The
purpose of criminal law rules is the discouragement of certain
behaviour and the encouragement of others only indirectly. The
primary effect of an inquiry rule would be the discouragement of
sexual behaviour in general, with the encouragement of explicitness as
a marginal effect only. There is little sexual excitement or romance for
either sex in the constant threat of rape. Nor are people particularly
good at being explicit about sexual relationships, a fact that has nothing
at all to do with the law. Moreover, one might ask whether the criminal
law is the appropriate medium within which to enforce a social policy
148. Pickard, supra, note 17 at 77.
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of good and accurate sexual communication. 149 Finally, such a policy
may not be entirely fair. Clark and Lewis state that "it would be both
unreasonable and unrealistic to prohibit all forms of coercive sexual
contact while any vestige remains of the old structures and their
attendant ideology. So long as men must bargain for sex, it would be
unjust to prohibit all coercive strategies. But clearly there must be
limits, and those limits must be agreed upon by both men and
women. ' 15
0
The sexual relationship, considered as an individual, social, or
political relationship, is just not as simple as driving a car. There is
more to social policy than the case at hand, and that is why the formula
exists. Those who would impose an inflexible rule must explain why
they would give power to the judges, rather than the juries, and why
they would seek to foreclose consideration of social policies beyond
their own conception of sexual politics. 151 It may be that any givenjury
will regard the objective criterion of recklessness as weighing against
an accused who claims that he did not advert at all to the question of the
consent of the victim. Equally, a jury may regard it as entirely
reasonable in any given case that the accused did not turn his mind to
the issue. There is no warrant to foreclose the issue by the creation of an
artificial rule. Nor is there any warrant for the view that rape victims
will receive less than just treatment, unless one is prepared to maintain
thatjuries will apply the criterion in an unjust manner. Even if that is the
case, it is an entirely different problem and will not be cured by the ad
hoc transfer of power to a judge who could be equally prejudiced.
149. Note, supra, note 86 at 437:
There is no moral consensus on this question and the criminal law should
therefore be reluctant to intervene . . . [It] would profoundly affect the politics
of sex and undercut established understandings as to permissible and
impermissible conduct. One need not travel all the way with Jeremy Bentham or
Herbert Marcuse to condemn such liability and indeed the decision in
Pappajohn itself is an expression of surplus repression rather than of
fundamental principle.
150. Clark and Lewis, supra, note 134 at 182.
151. Thus the characterization of sexual relationships by those who would require
advertence: Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 24, describes the act of sexual intercourse as
"hazardous"; Mewett thinks that such an activity carries with it a "high degree of
risk"; Note, supra, note 132 at 419; Pickard, supra, note 17 at 88-89, contrasts
possession and sexual intercourse by describing the former as "essential,
unavoidable, ubiquitous, and ordinarily harmless" - presumably the latter is not!
Pickard's view is properly criticized by Colvin, supra, note 82 at 360. This author
regards such a characterization of sexual behaviour simpliciter as totally
unacceptable.
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(iv) The Question of Foresight
The issue of the accused's advertence to the possible nonconsent of
the victim in the context of recklessness has two facets. Previous
discussion in this article has concerned the question of whether or
not failure to advert to the matter of consent is or should be
conclusive evidence of the recklessness of the accused. It is argued
that failure to advert should not be accepted as conclusive in the
objective phase of the recklessness inquiry. The issue of advertence
is also of significance in the subjective aspect of the recklessness
inquiry, that is, in the examination of the state of mind of the actor
himself. Here the question is not the objective one of whether the
failure to advert will always mean that the accused is reckless, but
the subjective question of whether failure to advert will always
mean the accused is not reckless. It is easy to confuse the two
questions, but there is a significant difference between them.1 52 The
problem arises in dealing with these questions because the
traditional formulations of recklessness require proof that the
accused actually foresaw the risk and consciously decided to
disregard it. 1 53 Howard, for example, states that "D cannot
disregard a risk until he knows about it, which means until he has a
belief on the point which coincides to a sufficient degree with the
facts . . . The requirement of advertence in recklessness means that
D is entitled to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be if the
actual facts are less favourable to him". 154 Moreover, it has been
forcefully argued that the requirement of advertence is necessary to
distinguish recklessness from negligence. 1
55
It is clear that the credible assertion, by the accused, of an honest
belief in consent will negate recklessness, even if that belief is
unreasonable. Moreover, if the requirement of advertence is to be
strictly adhered to, then an assertion by the accused that he did not
form an opinion on the issue will, if believed, also negate
recklessness. It is hardly surprising, then, that those who would
152. It is submitted that the two questions are confused by Wells in Swatting the
Subjectivist Bug [1982] Crim. L.R. 209 at 212-3 and Lord Lane C.J. in Pigg,
supra, note 125 at 769.
153. See, for example, the formulae quoted in notes 108 and 109, supra.
154. Howard, supra, note 19 at 358. See also Packer, The Model Penal Code and
Beyond (1963), 63 Col. L.R. 594 at 602-603; Stuart, supra, note 25 at 166, 167,
186; Gordon, supra, note 85 at 355; Treiman, supra, note 25 at 351, 352; McEwan
and Robilliard, supra, note 95 at 268-269.
155. Treiman, id., at 35 1. See also Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded
From Penal Liability (1963), 63 Col. L.R. 632 at 639, 640..
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lessen the standard of criminal responsibility for rape focus an
attack on the requirement of advertence. If successful, it would
remove a rule which is felt to be too favourable to the accused and,
by blurring the line between negligence and recklessness, it would
inject a desired element of objective liability into the criterion of
guilt.
In modern criminal law there has been a marked tendency to blur
the crucial threshhold of responsibility. Howard makes the point
neatly when he says that ". . .malice has been replaced by
intention, intention has been broadened to include both purpose and
belief, and now recklessness is replacing parts of intention.' 1 56
Very recent attacks on the requirement of advertence have
continued the trend by attacking the notion of subjective culpability
and broadening the concept of recklessness to take in parts of
negligence. By far the most important example of this is contained
in the recent decisions of the House of Lords in Caldwell and
Lawrence.
In Caldwell, 157 the accused was charged inter alia with damaging
property with the intent to endanger life or being reckless whether or
not life would be endangered. He had set fire to a hotel in a drunken
effort at revenge on the hotel owner. He claimed that he was drunk
at the time and that the thought that there might be persons in the
hotel whose lives would be in danger had not crossed his mind.
Lord Diplock stated in the course of his reasons that:
"Recklessness" as used in the new statutory definition of the
mens rea of these offences is an ordinary English word. It had not
by 1971 become a term of legal art with some more limited
esoteric meaning than that which it bore in ordinary speech - a
meaning which surely includes not only deciding to ignore a risk
of harmful consequences resulting from one's acts that one has
recognized as existing, but also failing to give any thought to
whether or not there is any such risk in circumstances where, if
any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious that
there was (emphasis added). 158
156. Howard, supra, note 19 at 355. See also Glanville Williams, supra, note 107
at 191: "The judges created the presumption of intent from probability for the same
reason as they have manipulated language in other areas of the criminal law: their
desire to procure and uphold the conviction of persons who were public dangers or
public nuisances. When a crime required intention and the judges thought this too
narrow, they bent the notion of intention."
157. Supra, note 94.
158. [1982] A.C. 341 at 353-354.
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In Lawrence, 159 the accused was charged with causing death by
reckless driving. The direction to the jury on recklessness came
eventually to the House of Lords, where Lord Diplock substantially
reaffirmed the definition of recklessness found in Caldwell by
saying that:
Recklessness on the part of the doer of an act does presuppose
that there is something in the circumstances that would have
drawn the attention of an ordinary prudent individual to the
possibility that his act was capable of causing the kind of serious
harmful consequences that the section which creates the offence
was intended to prevent, and that the risk of those harmful
consequences occurring was not so slight that an ordinary prudent
individual would feel justified in treating them as negligible. It is
only when this is so that the doer of the act is acting "recklessly"
if before doing the act, he either fails to give any thought to the
possibility of there being any such risk or having recognized that
there was such a risk, he nevertheless goes on to do it. 1 60
This definition of recklessness, which must be taken as representing
the view of the House of Lords, has provoked much academic
controversy.161 There has been much informative disputation about
whether or not Lord Diplock's definition represents a new concept
of recklessness, whether or not the definition has rendered the
concept of recklessness "objective" in nature, and, if so, whether
or not that is an appropriate direction in which to move and what its
consequences are for criminal law theory. There is, of course, the
additional question of whether Canadian courts will follow the
English developments and, if so, which of the developments it will
follow.
It is not the intention of this article to deal with these matters in
detail. It is sufficient to point out that, whether or not the definition
is a departure from the previous situation, 162 Lord Diplock has
159. [1982] A.C. 510,[198112 W.L.R. 524,[1981]1 All E.R. 974.
160. [198112W.L.R. 524at535.
161. See McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95; Glanville Williams,
Recklessness Redefined (1981), 40 Camb. L.J. 252; Note, supra, note 128; Griew,
supra, note 127; Glanville Williams, McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 121;
Glanville Williams, Divergent Interpretation of Recklessness (1982), 132 New
L.J. 289, 313, 336; MacKay, Some Developments in the Law of Rape (1982) 146 J.
P. 494; Syrota, A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness, [1982] Crim. L.R.
97.
162. It probably is a change; see, for example, the decisions in Cunningham,
[1957] 2 Q.B. 396; Lamb, [1967] 2 Q.B. 981; Venna, [1976] Q.B. 421; Parker,
[1977] 2 All E.R. 37; Stephenson, [1979] Q.B. 695;Flack v. Hunt (1980), 70 Cr.
App. R, 51.
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made it clear that, in his view, an accused may be reckless as to an
element of an offence even if the thought of the risk involved has
crossed his mind. That view is a significant departure from what the
law has hitherto been thought to be and, since in some cases the
accused will be found to be reckless even though the risk never
entered his or her mind, culpability on the basis of recklessness may
be assessed objectively. That is, it can be assessed without reference
to the state of mind of the actor involved, but by reference to some
standard that is external to the actor. The issues that are important
for present purposes are, first, the exact meaning of the definition of
recklessness and, second, the effect of its application to the law on
the mental element of rape.
Prior to the English decisions regarding the traditional view, there
had been some concern that the accused could only be found to be
reckless if he or she had considered the matter and had decided to
proceed anyway. That dissatisfaction was by no means confined to
those who felt that the culpability element of rape was too
favourable to the accused. Indeed, the cause of the unrest was the
fact, as identified above, 1 63 that the requirement of advertence cuts
across culpability in an artificial way. For example, Gordon argues
that:
Concentration on the concept of the subjective mental state may
lead us to ignore the fact that severe moral condemnation is
merited by a failure to foresee what any decent human being
would foresee. Indeed, the callousness, ruthlessness and
selfishness exhibited by such a failure may well be morally worse
than the behaviour of someone who regretfully takes a calculated
risk and does all he can to minimise that risk . . . as J. L. Austin
put it, "We may plead that we trod on the snail inadvertently: but
not on a baby - you ought to look where you're putting your
great feet. Of course it was (really), if you like inadvertence: but
that word constitutes a plea, which isn't going to be allowed,
because of standards. And if you try it on, you will be
subscribing to such dreadful standards that your last state will be
worse than your first.' 1 64
This dissatisfaction with the requirement of advertence found
expression in three ways. First, there was a marked tendency to
163. See, supra, notes 68, 142.
164. Gordon, supra, note 85 at 384-385, quoting from Austin, A Plea For
Excuses, reprinted in White, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford, 1968) 1 at 35.
See, for similar examples of restiveness about the advertence requirement,
Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 711-712; and Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 75.
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resort to the still vague and developing concept of wilful blindness
in order to find a form of culpability in advertence. 1 6 5 Second, there
has been a degree of flirtation with the slippery distinction between
what the Crown must prove and the way in which the Crown may
prove it. Third, there has been an exploration of the limits of the
notion of advertence.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the utility of the concept of wilful
blindness, discussion turns to the qualification upon the requirement
of advertence attempted through the use of the manner of proof. The
matter was expressed well by Martin J. A. in Buzzanga and
Durocher, when he said that:
Recklessness . . . requires actual foresight on the part of the
accused that his conduct may bring about the prohibited
consequence, although I am not unmindful that for some
purposes recklessness may denote only a marked departure from
objective standards . . . . Since people are usually able to foresee
the consequences of their acts, if a person does an act likely to
produce certain consequences it is, in general, reasonable to
assume that the accused also foresaw the probable consequences
of his act and if he, nevertheless, acted so as to produce those
consequences, that he intended them. The greater the likelihood
of the relevant consequences ensuing from the accused's act, the
easier it is to draw the inference that he intended those
consequences. The purpose of this process, however, is to
determine what the particular accused intended, not to fix him
with the intention that a reasonable person might be assumed to
have in the circumstances, where doubt exists as to the actual
intention of the accused. 1
66
Hence, and despite the ghost of D.P.P. v. Smith lurking in the
background, 1 67 the problem of the accused, who claims inad-
vertence in a situation in which the reasonable person could not
have failed to consider the matter, is solved by saying that the claim
will not be believed unless the accused can produce an explanation
165. A particular example is to be seen in Pickard, supra, note 17 at 89. See also,
infra, notes 189ff.
166. Supra, note 91 at 386-387. The point is very commonly made: see, for
example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 76-77; Heilbron Report, supra,
note 13 at paras. 53-56; Stuart, supra, note 25 at 162-163; Gordon, supra, note 85
at 374, 378-379, 386; Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 258; Wasik and
Thompson, "Turning A Blind Eye" As Constituting Mens Rea (1981), 32 N. Ire.
L.Q. 328 at 338-340; Colvin, supra, note 82 at 369; Treiman, supra, note 25 at
357, 358; Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 289.
167. [1961] A.C. 290, (H.L.) The spectre of this case has haunted most of the
discussions cited heretofore.
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of the individual case that will destroy the normal process of
inference. The focus of the inquiry is still the state of mind of the
actor and not what the reasonable person would have done, but the
process of proof superimposes an objective criterion as a matter of
credibility. Glanville Williams neatly points to the distinction as the
difference between the normative "he would have foreseen it" and
the factual "he must have foreseen it". 168 It is obvious, of course,
that there is no rule in this, only the reassurance that the belief of the
factfinder will necessarily bar the accused of an unmeritorious
defence, a possibility that is apparently left open in the letter of the
law.
Exploration of the notion of advertence has also proved useful in
avoiding what are seen to be the injustices of the rule of advertence.
The simple point is that the requirement of advertence need not be
confined to the accused who actually thinks about the relevant
matter at the relevant time. Rather, it is said that knowledge or
awareness may also refer to knowledge which is stored in the brain
and could be called upon if required. 169 Thus, "[w]e use the word
'knowledge' to include information that may be summoned to mind
at will, or almost at will."' 1 70 This concept was recently examined
in some detail by Colvin, who said that:
171
Inquiry into experience of risk is still inquiry into the actor's own
state of mind. It is directed towards a conclusion on what he
knew and therefore could have brought to mind simply with some
thought. An objection to this inclusion within the scope of
recklessness would have to be based on some other ground than
the principle of subjectivity . ..As long as attention is directed
to the individual's own capacities and not those of some
hypothetical "reasonable person", a judgment of fault can be
made on the ground that he had a fair opportunity to think
otherwise than he did. The major difficulty is not with culpability
168. Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 76.
169. See, for example, Stuart, supra, note 25 at 188; Glanville Williams, supra,
note 161 at 289, col. 2-3; Syrota, supra, note 161 at 99-100; Colvin, supra, note 82
at 361, quoting R. v. Murphy, [1980] 2 All E.R. 325 at 328, in which it was said,
"when one speaks of something which a person knows, is one referring to
knowledge which is stored in the brain and available if called upon or to knowledge
which is actually present because it has been called upon?" See also discussion in
Wasik and Thompson, supra, note 166 at 331-332, of a distinction posed between
"active" and "passive" knowledge; active knowledge is that in one's mind,
passive knowledge is that which is temporarily forgotten but capable of recall.
170. Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 78. See also Duff, Recklessness [1980]
Crim. L.R. 282 at 290-291.
171. Colvin, supra, note 82 at 361-363.
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itself but rather with sufficiency of culpability. Is the actor who
experientially knew of a risk so culpable that he may justly be
exposed to the penalties facing the actor who was conscious of
the risk?' 72
Colvin concludes, however, that a compromise between the strict
requirement of advertence and the vague, 173 open-ended notion of
experiential knowledge is the preferred solution.
A person should be held reckless if he unjustifiably takes a risk
and either realizes that the risk is present or realizes that others
would think the risk is present. Realization may occur at the time
when the risk is taken or at some earlier point in the same
transaction. Lack of awareness which is due to culpable cognitive
impairment should not be a defence except for offences carrying
a fixed penalty or involving an ulterior mental element. 1
74
These two methods of expanding reckless culpability may, of
course, be used together. The combination is made clear by Smith
in his comments on a decision of the English Court of Appeal in
Bashir:
The approved test requires us to consider what he [D] would have
thought if he had stopped to think. If, as the jury must be taken to
have found on the judge's direction, any ordinary and reasonable
man would have appreciated that there was a substantial risk that
the girl was not consenting, the defendant also, if he had stopped
to think, must have appreciated this, unless he was subnormal.
1 75
It is only with this background information that the dispute
concerning the meaning to be given to the decisions of the House of
Lords in Caldwell and Lawrence can be understood. There can be
no doubt at all that Lord Diplock has laid to rest the strict view that
the accused cannot be reckless in the absence of a conscious
advertence to the risk in question. The question is only as to how far
beyond that strict requirement he has gone. Despite Colvin's
espousal and defence of an intermediate position, it is submitted that
Lord Diplock can only have had one of two alternatives in mind.
172. Colvin, id., at 363, 367-368. See also Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at
261.
173. See, for example, Hall, supra, note 155 at 639-640. At 640: "A person either
has that sensitivity or he lacks it. If he had normal sensitivity, presumably he would
have expressed it in taking due care, especially because a collision also endangers
his own life. If he lacks that sensitivity, he may be careless. To declare that a
person had the competence to be sensitive to ordinary dangers is a tautology, since
competence is or includes that sensitivity."
174. Colvin, supra, note 82 at 373.
175. Note, Rape [1982] Crim. L.R. 687 at 688-689.
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The key lies in the proper interpretation of the word "obvious", in
the phrase "obvious risk". If the word is to be interpreted as
meaning "obvious to the reasonable person", or some other
standard which is external to the accused, then Lord Diplock has
clearly conflated negligence and recklessness. If, on the other hand,
the word is to be interpreted as meaning "obvious to the accused
had he or she thought about it", or some similar standard which
focuses on the actor's mental capacities, then Lord Diplock has
simply added, to the traditional definition of the advertence
requirement, the interpretive flexibilities discussed above.
1 76
Academic opinion is divided on what the proper interpretation is. 1
77
It is sadly true that Lord Diplock has not pronounced clearly one
way or the other, and support can be found in the relevant opinions
for either proposition.17 8 The position is also not clarified by
subsequent developments in which the Court of Appeal appears to
have decided that the meaning to be given to recklessness differs in
Caldwell from that to be given in Lawrence. 1
79
Leaving Lawrence and driving offences aside as special cases, it
is submitted that the preferable interpretation is that which preserves
the subjective view of recklessness but modifies it to soften the strict
advertence requirement thought by many to have been
indefensible. 180 In the absence of clear directions to the contrary,
the interpretation which eliminates the previously clear distinction
between subjective recklessness and objective negligence ought not
to be regarded as having been swept away, and such a direction has
not been clearly made.' 8 ' Given the decision that the new
formulation of recklessness applies to the rape offence, 18 2 the effect
of this on the decision in Morgan must be discussed in order to state
176. This is the interpretation favoured after extensive analysis by Glanville
Williams, supra, note 161 at, for example, 97.
177. Compare the optimistic interpretation of Syrota and Glanville Williams, ibid,
with the pessimism of Griew, supra, note 127 and Smith [1981] Crim. L.R.
658-661, and the uncompromising objectivism in both theory and interpretation of
McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95.
178. Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 290, col. 3.
179. See Note, Road Traffic [1982] Crim. L.R. 692, (R. v. Madigan).
180. Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 272; McEwan and Robilliard, supra,
note 95 at 282-283; Syrota, supra, note 161 at 103.
181. See, for example, Wasik and Thompson, supra, note 166 at 338: "This is a
policy matter of great importance for the criminal law, but the issue should not be
baulked simply by running together the legal concepts of 'negligence' and
Irecklessness'. They should not be construed so as to shade into or overlap each
other in this way."
182. R. v. Pigg, supra, note 125; R. v. Bashir, [1982] Crim. L.R. 687.
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the degree and justifiability of the risk involved, given the variety of
the subjectivist position on the consent element in rape.
The first reaction of those who assumed or reasoned that the more
objective interpretation of recklessness was, in fact, that Morgan
had been overturned in this respect and, citing Pigg, that the
minimum criterion for liability was an inquiry into the perceptions
of the ordinary or reasonable person. 183 But this would surely be an
odd occurrence: it would be strange indeed if the House of Lords
directly contradicted such an important decision without mentioning
the fact. Moreover, Pigg is of little assistance. The Court of Appeal
in that case merely reproduced the ambiguous formulae from
Caldwell and Lawrence without further explanation. If the problem
is to be resolved, the position must be considered from first
principles, as follows. An accused will either fall into the class of
persons who adverted to the question of the risk of nonconsent, or
will not. If the accused did advert to the risk and if all other aspects
of the crime and recklessness are present, then he or she will be
found reckless if the unjustifiable risk was disregarded. If, instead,
the accused considers the risk and decides that there is none or that
whatever risk there is is only fanciful, then, regardless of whether or
not a reasonable person would have reached that same decision, the
accused cannot be deemed reckless. Nor does the redefinition by the
House of Lords affect that result.' 8 4 However, if the accused does
not advert to the risk which is found by some objective inquiry to
exist, then the accused will be found reckless on the objective
interpretation of Caldwell if the risk would have been obvious to a
reasonable person, and he or she will be found reckless on the
subjective interpretation if the jury is of the opinion that, had he or
she adverted to the question, he or she would have seen the risk.
The matters which arise from this situation are best discussed in the
context of a specific example. In R. v. McEwan, Mr. McEwan was
charged with two counts of rape. 185 The complainant and her brother
had gone to a party, and had entered a car with the expectation of being
183. See, for example, Cowley, The Retreat From Morgan [1982] Crim. L.R. 198
at 206; Wells, supra, note 152 at 214; MacKay, supra, note 161 at 146-147.
McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95, escape by arguing, totally against all
evidence, that recklessness is not sufficient mens rea for rape; that foresight of the
possibility that the woman did not consent amounts to intention, not recklessness,
and will suffice for conviction for rape, and, hence, Morgan is preserved, despite
Lawrence and Caldwell.
184. See, for example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 313 col. 1,336 col.
1-3.
185. R. v. McEwan, supra, note 49.
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driven home. When the car suffered mechanical trouble, a second car
stopped to assist and, as a consequence, the occupants of both cars
went voluntarily to a house occupied by one of those in the second car.
It was alleged that, during the drive to the house, the accused and three
others raped the victim in the car. The accused was found not guilty of
that rape by the jury, though the others were found guilty of various
offences. Shortly after arriving at the house, the victim was allegedly
raped by a number of men, including the accused, who was convicted
of rape on this count. The accused said in his unswom statements that:
I never asked the girl if I could have intercourse with her, but the way
she was lying in the car and in the bedroom, I thought she was
willing. She wasn't crying or anything. She said she liked it in the
car. She didn't say anything in the bedroom. It is all a bit confusing
now, but if I knew she wasn't willing, I wouldn't have had
intercourse with her. I just turned eighteen, and I'm not guilty.
Assuming that the story is credible enough that one can say that the
accused did not intend intercourse without consent and did not have
intercourse knowing that the victim did not consent, then the question
of recklessness must arise. Did the accused advert to the question of
consent? It is difficult to determine this from the statement given. He
admits he made no inquiry. Let us assume that he did not advert, and
that he supposed that she consented, although, in fact, she did not. On
the objective view, he will be reckless if a reasonable man in his
position would have foreseen the risk that she did not consent. On the
subjective view, he will be found reckless if, had he given thought to
the matter, he would have foreseen the risk that she did not consent. It is
clear that, had he actually given thought to the matter and made an
incorrect decision, the fact that he adverted would increase his
credibility and, whether or not the decision was reasonable, would
constitute no legal bar to his denial of mens rea. It should also be clear
that the conflicting interpretations do not produce exclusive answers.
Mr. McEwan's inadvertence may well be unreasonable on the facts,
but there is in this no guarantee that, he had thought about the matter, he
would have come to the reasonable conclusion. Equally, his
inadvertence may be totally reasonable, but if he is a sensitive human
being, it may well be that, had he considered the matter, he would have
come to the unreasonable yet correct conclusion. Given the extent of
possible overlap, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there may be
little significant difference in practice between the two tests,
particularly if one takes into account the notions of wilful blindness,
The Rapist's Charter 497
credibility, and experiential knowledge. ' 8 6 Furthermore, the overlap
shows that, even if the objective view is preferred, recklessness does
not require that the accused advert to the question of consent, for, if the
inadvertence is reasonable, the accused cannot be found to be reckless.
Finally, it should be noted that, if the objective interpretation prevails,
it leads to the odd result that the accused, who considers the risk and
concludes, unreasonably, that there is no risk or that it is merely
fanciful, is not reckless, whereas the accused who unreasonably does
not consider the risk will be found reckless. As Colvin has pointed out,
since so much turns on the matter of advertence to risk, it may be that
whether the subjective or objective interpretation is adopted, the courts




The objective position on the case of an accused who is found to have
had sexual intercourse with another without the consent of that other,
but who pleads in defence that he thought that the other consented to the
sexual act, is that the accused must assert a mistaken belief in a set of
facts which, if true, would render the behaviour innocent of criminal
liability and, crucially, such a mistake must be objectively reasonable.
It is certain that the accused will bear the evidential burden of going
forward with that defence in the demonstration of a reasonable doubt
on the matter and it is quite possible that the accused will bear the
burden of proof of that defence on the balance of probabilities. The
emphasis of such a defence is on the reasonableness of the mistake
regarding consent, and although the exact meaning of reasonableness
has been deferred for subsequent discussion, it is clear that
reasonableness as a requirement functions principally as a bar, in the
sense that it confers additional power on the judge to control the
fact-finding function of the jury. Moreover, while the traditional view
of the defence of reasonableness restricts its availability to those who
have adverted in some fashion to the fact at issue, it has nevertheless
been pointed out that such a requirement is objectionable in theory and
whimsical in application. By contrast, the subjectivist position on
culpability has been seen to rest on the concept of recklessness with
regard to the nonconsent of the other person. That concept has two
186. The point is most strongly made by Colvin, supra, note 82 at 359-360,
quoted, infra, at note 196.
187. Colvin, id., at 367.
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parts. With respect to the first part, it has been argued that the jury
should be told, on present law, to find the accused reckless if there was
a possibility that the otherperson might not have consented. Thejury is
to bear in mind the proviso that remote or fanciful possibilities ought
not to be considered, and must consider the matter in the context of
balancing the social value involved in taking the risk that was found to
exist against the social harm of the danger inherent in the risk. The
second part of the concept is open to disputation, but it has been
submitted that the accused will be found to be reckless if he foresaw
that the other person might not have been consenting, given the
conditions described above, or if he did not advert to an obvious risk
that the other was not consenting, a risk which, if and only if he had
adverted to the matter, he would have foreseen. However, a belief on
the part of the accused that the other person was consenting will
mandate acquittal, no matter how unreasonable such a belief may have
been.
It may be remarked at this point with some justice that, in practice,
the difference between the two positions may be more apparent than
real. The criterion of recklessness may be seen to converge in a number
of respects with the defence of reasonable mistake of fact. First, the
dilution of the requirement of advertence for a finding of recklessness
has obscured the distinction between recklessness and negligence
simpliciter. Second, that dilution has involved the incorporation, into
the concept of recklessness, of a concept which resembles closely the
still undeveloped notion of wilful blindness. The use of that concept or,
even more dangerous, the interaction of that concept with the grey area
between matters of proof and matters of legal requirements, 188 or with
the extended definition of recklessness, may mean that any distinction
between objective and subjective culpability will be obscured forever.
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to deal in detail with the
slippery slope of wilful blindness, not least because its development is
retarded and its application erratic. Like many erosions of basic
principle, it is rooted in decisions which were made in an effort to
188. An excellent example is provided by Griffiths (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 14 at
18:
To direct the jury that the offence is committed if the defendant, suspecting that
the goods were stolen, deliberately shut his eyes to the circumstances as an
alternative to knowing or believing the goods were stolen is a misdirection. To
direct the jury that, in common sense and in law, they may find that the
defendant knew or believed the goods to be stolen because he deliberately
closed his eyes to the circumstances is a perfectly proper direction.
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circumvent what is regarded as an unmeritorious defence, and to
convict a person who would, on strict principle, be innocent. Hence, it
is a matter of little surprise that the doctrine has found most of its utility
in the expansion of already widely expanded offences which, as a
matter of political policy, have been enacted to deal with incipient
criminality. The most obvious examples are offences involving the
possession of drugs or stolen goods and, even in the latter case, the
extension of culpability to wilful blindness has been controversial. 189
The definition of wilful blindness should be that proposed by Glanville
Williams, as follows:
A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost
be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact: he
realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final
confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny
knowledge. This, and this alone, is wilful blindness. It requires in
effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the
administration of justice. 190
The crucial point of such a definition is the requirement that the
accused adverted to the mattei at issue at some point before wilfully
closing his or her eyes. 191 It is, however, very clear that the doctrine of
wilful blindness can be used illicitly outside the concept of subjectivity
in order to convict those who fail some duty of reasonable
investigation, 192 and that the "evidence tending to show wilful
blindness could just as easily be interpreted as showing only
negligence.' 193 The limited history of the judicial approach to the
concept of wilful blindness demonstrates the dangers of its
189. See, for example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 85-87; Mewett and
Manning, supra, note 32 at 116-119; Comment, Willful Blindness As A Substitute
For Criminal Knowledge (1977), 63 Iowa L.R. 466; Wilson, The Doctrine of
Wilful Blindness (1979), 28 U.N.B.L.J. 175; Wasik and Thompson, supra, note
166.
190. Glanville Williams, supra, note 95 at 159. See also Wasik and Thompson,
id., at 329-330, in which it is said that "it is thus central to the idea that D's
'blindness' is induced deliberately, which distinguishes his mental state from
commonplace ignorance or inconsistency of belief. Herein lies the root of D's fault
or culpability (emphasis in original)."
191. Wasik and Thompson, id., at 337, (criticizing Parker, supra, note 162), and
at 340.
192. Comment, supra, note 189 at 471: "Those American courts that have
accepted the concept of wilful blindness are themselves divided on the question
whether such blindness constitutes actual knowledge or instead some lesser degree
of knowledge . . . the vast majority would rule that it is rather only a substitute for
actual knowledge."
193. Id., at 477, and also at 482-483. For case examples of the dangers in three
legal systems, see Parker, supra, note 162; the trial judges' directions reversed in
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development. 194 When the possibilities of the interaction between the
extended definition of recklessness and the various devices used to
dilute it are considered in conjunction with the near certainty that the
concept of wilful blindness will be expanded judicially, the scope for
the objective judgment of accused rapists becomes unlimited. 1
9 5
The discussion which follows concerns the policy considerations
which separate the adherents of the objectivist position from those who
espouse the subjectivist position. It should, however, be kept in mind
that the two positions are not so different from each other as they seem.
Colvin comments that:
On the present theory of subjective recklessness . . . it makes little
practical difference whether a subjective or an objective test is used
for offences such as rape or criminal negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle. This is because of the common understanding that,
under some conditions, there is a chance of injury as a result of
driving and of non-consent as a circumstance of having sexual
intercourse. This understanding is manifested in the deliberation
and caution which is generally displayed by those who engage in
these types of conduct. Since the actor's knowledge of social
definitions can usually be inferred from their existence, the focus of
inquiry will tend to be objective. Attention will be directed to the
content of the common understanding respecting the circumstances
of the particular case. The actor's own state of mind is more likely to
be the central issue where the risks of conduct are less widely
appreciated. 19
6
The trend to devalue the traditional focus on the subjective state of
mind of those accused of serious crimes may be deplored.
Nevertheless, the trend exists and cannot be denied. It is very clear on
any interpretation of the subjectivist position, as it is also clear on any
interpretation of the objectivist position, that the accused in Morgan
were guilty of the crime with which they were charged;Morgan, unlike
McEwvan, 197 was an easy case. Finally, when the rhetoric is swept
aside, the similarity of the two positions in practice prompts agreement
with Stuart, who said that: "righteous affirmation of the subjective
approach to criminal responsibility is nugatory if we are to resort to
exceptions which eat up the main principle. If we do want to impose
Stone (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 241, (Ont. C.A.) and Fallon (1981), 4 A. Crim. R.
411, (S.A.C.A.).
194. Ibid. See also Wilson, supra, note 189 at 194 and Wasik and Thompson,
supra, note 166 at 328, 329.
195. Waski and Thompson, id., at 342.
196. Colvin, supra, note 82 at 359-360, 373.
197. Supra, note 49, discussed at note 185, supra.
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criminal responsibility for failing to measure up to an objective
standard, let us do this quite openly, assuming we can make out a
good philosophical case for it."'' 98
V. For Objectivism
(a) Lord Simon's View
Lord Simon was the sole member of the House of Lords inMorgan who
thought that, apart from authority, any belief by the accused that the
victim was consenting must be reasonable if it is to excuse. Lord
Simon's reasoning is too extensive to quote, but the following is a
summary of his views:
(1) Mens rea crimes may be classified as those involving basic
intent or those involving ulterior intent. The classification of the
mental element involved in any given case turns on whether the
mental element is attached to a part of the actus reus, in which case it
is basic, or whether the mental element is part of the crime
independently of the acts, consequences, or circumstances
prescribed in the offence as a matter of fact, in which case it is
ulterior. 199
(2) The consent element in rape consists of a prescribed fact, the
lack of consent, and a mental element attached to the fact, such as the
knowledge of nonconsent. It is, therefore, a basic intent.
20 0
(3) When a matter of basic intent is at issue, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the corresponding fact was present is
sufficient prima facie proof that the basic intent was also present, so
that the burden shifts to the accused to negate the inference of intent.
On the other hand, proof of the actus reus carries no implications for




(4) Rape is a crime of basic intent. Hence, proof that the woman did
not in fact consent, being prima facie proof that the accused knew
that she did not consent, is sufficient to compel him to rebut the
inference. Hence, the evidentiary burden is upon the accused to
deny mens rea. The only way in which thiscan be done is by showing
that the mistaken belief was reasonable. 202
This theory has attracted a number of critics and, as far as one can
tell from the line-up of academic commentators, no supporters. It is
submitted that, for a number of reasons, it is unsound and ought to
198. Stuart, supra, note 25 at 188. See also Gordon, supra, note 85 at 387.
199. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 363-364.
200. Id., 365.
201. Id., at 364-365.
202. Id., 365, 366-367.
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be buried. First, it is incorrect to rely upon what Fletcher calls the
"willingness of common-law judges to conflate the burden of going
forward with the risk of non-persuasion." 20 3 As Smith has recently
remarked:
It is not possible or sensible to conclude from a procedural quirk
anything about the scope of the substantive law. The explanation
may well be that appearances are deceiving, and that the
inference as to intent cannot be drawn from what was seen, but
for reasons not apparent to the witness. If the defendant's
explanation is that he made a mistake, we cannot conclude that it
must be a reasonable, non-negligent mistake merely because it
lies with the defendant to assert that a mistake was made. 20 4
That is especially so in the classic case where knowledge cannot be
inferred immediately because there is no evidence that the victim
resisted the advances of the accused, but submitted unwillingly by
reason of fear. Second, there is a fallacy in Lord Simon's reasoning,
as is revealed by Cowley in his statement that:
There is no connection between the incidence of the evidential
burden and the question whether the mistake must be reasonable,
the main reason being that an evidential burden on the defendant
merely requires him to give some reasonable evidence of belief as
opposed to evidence of reasonable belief. 20
5
It has been suggested that the roots of the fallacy lie in the law as it
was before the accused could give evidence. 20 6 Without the benefit
of evidence from the accused, the jury needed a test of
reasonableness in order to evaluate whether the mistake had in fact
been made. That is obviously not the case today.
203. Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 530.
204. Smith, Rethinking the Defence of Mistake (1982), 2 Ox. J.L.S. 429 at 435.
Fletcher, id., at 707-708, and Cross, supra, note 17 at 546, criticize Lord Simon's
view on a similar ground. Moreover, at [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 364, Lord Simon
admits that the shifting of the burden is not really invariable; it happens
"generally".
205. Cowley, supra, note 183 at 207, citing Glanville Williams, The Mental
Element in Crime (1975), 125 New L. J. 968 at 969 and comment by Smith, [1975]
Crim. L.R. 40 at 43-44. See also Sellers, supra, note 18 at 248 n. 17, in which it is
said that "his argument, doubtful in several aspects, seems to rest on the
fundamental misconception that some (i.e. reasonable) evidence of a mistake
(necessary to discharge the evidential burden) is the same thing as some evidence of
a reasonable mistake. Perhaps the moral is to beware of the term 'reasonable'
(emphasis added)."
206. See, for example, Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 99; Cross, supra,
note 17 at 546; O'Connor, Mistake And Ignorance In Criminal Cases (1976), 39
M.L.R. 644 at 654.
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Another aspect of Lord Simon's view is more controversial. His
logical construction rests, in part, on a question-begging assertion
of injustice and, in part, on the assertion that "the rationale of
requiring reasonable grounds for the mistaken belief must lie in the
law's consideration that a bald assertion of belief for which the
accused can indicate no reasonable ground is evidence of
insufficient substance to raise any issue requiring the jury's
consideration. 20 7 The rationale consists of two parts. The first part
holds that a bald assertion of the accused's belief in consent is not
sufficient evidence of that belief to put it to the jury. The second
part holds that, because that is so, the accused must produce
reasonable grounds for that belief before the matter can go to the
jury. Hence, the requirement is one of reasonable mistake, not
merely of mistake. As Cowley has pointed out, there is a theoretical
difference between requiring proof of a reasonable belief, and
reasonable proof of belief. 20 8 If that is accepted, as it surely must
be, the word "because" has no logical force and the proposition
collapses. But Cowley's distinction requires that it is possible, as a
matter of practice, for an accused to produce evidence of belief
which is external to his own assertion, and which is at once
reasonable evidence of his own belief and yet not evidence of the
reasonableness of his alleged belief. The theoretical gnat has
produced a practical camel. That camel is called Pappajohn. 2
0 9
(b) The Decision in Pappajohn
In Pappajohn, the complainant was a real estate seller and the
accused was a businessman seeking to sell his house. They met by
arrangement for lunch, which began at 1:00 p.m. and lasted until 4
or 4:30 p.m. and involved the consumption by both parties of a
great deal of alcohol. During the lunch, the two visited a friend of
the complainant who later testified that "it look to me like she hand
[sic] it to him on a platter." After the lunch, they left to go to the
house of the accused. Each later gave a very different version of
what happened in the house. The complainant claimed that a
number of acts of rape took place against her will and in spite of her
protests and struggles. The accused held that a sexual encounter,
involving no more than some coy objection on the part of the
207. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347 at 367, quoting Bridge J. from the decision of the
Court of Appeal inMorgan, [1975] 1 All E.R. 8 at 14.
208. Supra, note 205.
209. Supra, note 45.
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complainant, had occurred. He stated that the encounter ended
when he attempted sexual bondage and she objected. It was agreed
that, at 7:30 p.m., the complainant ran from the house in a state of
distress with a man's bow tie around her neck and her hands tied
behind her back. The trial judge decided that the relevant issue was
whether or not there was, in fact, consent, and he refused to put to
the jury any issue of mistaken belief in consent. In the end, the jury
convicted, and a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
agreed with this ruling, although Lambert J.A., dissenting, held that
there was sufficient evidence of honest and reasonable mistaken
belief to go to the jury. 210 A majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada also agreed with the ruling of the trial judge and six of the
seven Supreme Court judges took the opportunity to state that
Morgan was correctly decided. Thus, in Canada there is no
requirement that the accused's mistaken belief in consent be a
reasonable belief. 211 Nevertheless, the majority may well have
diluted the force of that holding in its decision on the facts. 212 Their
decision resembles nothing so much as the "rationale", provided
by Bridge J. and adopted by Lord Simon, for reaching the opposite
conclusion on the law.
213
McIntyre J., for the majority, began by adopting the test,
formulated by Fauteux J. in Kelsey, for controlling what facts are
put to the jury. This test requires that there be "some evidence or
matter apt to convey a sense of reality in the argument, and in the
grievance." ' 21 4 His Lordship correctly stated his task as that of
finding, in the evidence, something which would give a sense
of reality to the contention that the accused may have believed that
the complainant was consenting, even though she did not consent.
He was unable to do so for two reasons, one of law and one of fact.
The factual reason, described in the following, is based on the
inconsistency of the two stories:
The two stories are . . . diametrically opposed on this vital issue.
It is not for the trial judge to weigh them and prefer one to the
210. [1979] 1 W.W.R. 562, 45 C.C.C. (2d) 67, 5 C.R. (3d) 193, (B.C.C.A.).
211. 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 495-500 (Dickson J.), at 515 (McIntyre J.). Martland
J. dissented (at 485) because, in his view, the issue did not arise on this particular
appeal.
212. Id., at 515, holding that the "defence" of mistaken belief was properly
withdrawn from the jury on the facts at bar.
213. See, supra, note 207.
214. Kelsey, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 220, 105 C.C.C. 97 at 102, 16 C.R. 119, cited, id.,
at 510.
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other. It is for him in this situation, however, to recognize the
issue which arises on the evidence for the purpose of deciding
what defences are open. In this situation the only realistic issue
which can arise is the simple issue of consent or no consent. In
my opinion, the trial judge was correct in concluding that there
simply was not sufficient evidence to justify the putting of the
defence of mistake of fact to the jury. He left the issue of consent
and that was the only one arising on the evidence. 215
It should be noted that this part of the opinion cannot and should not
be taken as authority for the proposition that the accused can never
assert, alternatively, that the complainant consented or that he
believed that she consented. It may well be that such cases are rare,
but there is nothing illogical in that position. 216 McIntyre J. is only
saying that such a position is not open on the facts of this individual
case, and his basis for this claim is the total inconsistency of the two
stories.
An assessment of the evidence reveals that, if one believes the
account of the complainant, the accused cannot have believed that
she consented. The account of the accused, however, can be taken
primarily as an assertion that she consented, but that if she did not
consent, all the circumstances led him to believe that she did
consent. The reason for this is simple. When an accused says "She
consented", he can only be saying that he believed that she
consented. It is, therefore, either difficult or impossible to examine
evidence and say that, in one case, it is evidence that she consented,
whereas in another it is evidence that he believed she was
consenting even though she did not. 217 It follows that one can
believe the account given by the accused and yet believe that the
complainant did not consent. Moreover, there is no reason why the
jury should be compelled to take one story or the other as a complete
and accurate account. The jury may well decide that both are
coloured or embroidered versions of the incident which lay, in
reality, somewhere between the two perceptions.
The second reason given by McIntyre J. for his failure to find
evidence that the accused believed that the complainant was
consenting is a legal reason. It deals with the impossibility of
215. Id., at 514.
216. See, for example, Note, supra, note 86 at 435.
217. Hence, in examination of the evidence in the context of mistaken belief,
Dickson J. listed nine matters in evidence lending some credibility to the story of
the accused (52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 505). However, these matters go principally to
the argument, not at issue on appeal, that V consented in fact.
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separating evidence which would lead the accused to say "she
consented" from evidence which would lead the accused to say "I
thought she consented". McIntyre J. joined with Bridge J. in stating
that the latter type of evidence is of minimal value:
It would seem to me that if it is considered necessary in this case
to charge the jury on the defence of mistake of fact, it would be
necessary to do so in all cases where the complainant denies
consent and the accused asserts it. To require the putting of the
alternative defence of mistaken belief in consent, there must be,
in my opinion, some evidence beyond the mere assertion of belief
in consent by counsel for the appellant. This evidence must
appear from or be supported by sources other than the appellant
in order to give it any air of reality.
2 18
It is submitted that Bridge J., Lord Simon, and McIntyre J. are quite
wrong in this. One measure of their error is that the first and second
of these judges offer the view in order to support their objectivist
position, while the last does so despite his support of the subjectivist
position. The unsoundness of this view is not, however, restricted to
that matter. McIntyre J. quite clearly believes that he is considering
a defence. 2 19 That view is, as it were, unreasonable. Once it is
conceded that the consent element in rape requires mens rea, then
whether one subscribes to Morgan or not, that mens rea, whatever it
is, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Crown. The
jury must be directed in such terms and, hence, the issue of the
proof of mens rea is always before the jury. It is not a matter of
defence to urge that the Crown has not proved its case.
22 0
Moreover, even a bald assertion by the accused is some evidence of
its content. Its weight and credence is a matter for the jury.
22 1
There is some authority for the proposition that the view is wrong
even in cases where one is considering an affirmative defence of
reasonable belief. The Tasmanian Supreme Court decided in 1972
that the correct construction of the Tasmanian Criminal Code was
that mens rea as to consent is not required, but that the accused may
escape conviction if he shows the affirmative defence of reasonable
218. Id., at 514, applied inDeol (1981), 23 C.R. (3d) 324, (Alta. C.A.).
219. Id., at 509: paragraph 3 uses the word "defence" no less than eight times; see
also id., at 510, 515.
220. See, for example, Note, supra, note 86 at 434-435; Dickson J. id., at 494,
where it is stated that: "[m]istake of fact is more accurately seen as a negation of
guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive defence."
221. See, for example, Cross, supra, note 17 at 546; Note, supra, note 100 at 206;
Note, supra, note 175 at 688.
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mistake. 222 As with the opposite conclusion in Morgan, this
decision provoked some disquiet. 223 Not the least of this dissent
occurred in the Tasmanian Supreme Court itself, where in 1972,
Chambers and Neasey J.J. commented that the original decision
might require reconsideration in an appropriate case in the future.
224
Their comment was part of their decision in Ingram, which
concerned the question of whether the trial judge had properly failed
to put the affirmative defence to the jury. Chambers J. held that "in
my judgment when an accused says in evidence 'she consented' he
is saying no more than 'my belief is that she was consenting'. A
formal 'offer and acceptance' is unlikely in most cases of alleged
rape and juries must determine questions of consent and mistake by
a consideration of the conduct of the parties, which may be
unmistakeable in its significance." 225 On the specific matter of the
accused who baldly asserts that he believed that the complainant
was consenting, the court adopted the directions set out in the
judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sperotto.
226
Those directions state that a bald assertion should go to the jury,
along with the direction that there is no material capable of
supporting that belief. 227 But it is clear that supporting matters may
come from the account of the accused alone, unsupported by
evidence from third parties.
228
The weakness of the proposition may be judged by its various
contexts. Bridge J. and Lord Simon are of the opinion that it
supports the claim that the test of culpability ought to be objective.
McIntyre J. supports the subjective view, and the Tasmanian Court
of Appeal, while espousing the objective view, adopts a contrary
position, perhaps because it wants to give defendants every
opportunity to use the limited objective test which it feels to be too
harsh. 229 Also problematic is why a different test should be imposed
for the consideration of the jury if the accused says that the woman
222. See, supra, note 47.
223. Contrast the approval of Cox, Law Reform And Rape Under The Tasmanian
Criminal Code, in Scutt, supra, note I at 49, with the disapproval of Blackwood,
The Mental Element in Rape in the Criminal Code (1982), 56 A.L.J. 474.
224. Ingram, supra, note 29 at 258, 262.
225. Id., at 267.
226. Supra, note 48.
227. [1970] 1 N.S.W.R. 502 at 505-506 (propositions 8 and 10), citing Gammage
(1969), 44 A.L.J.R. 36 at 39, (H.C.).
228. Ingram, supra, note 29 at 259.
229. Blackwood, supra, note 22 at 478.
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consented than would be imposed if the accused said that he
thought that the woman consented. Surely it is nothing less than
bizarre for McIntyre J. to hold that the story of the accused in
Morgan had an air of reality, but that the story of the accused in
Pappajohn did not.
23 0
The most charitable explanation for this silly rule is guilt about
the legal tests for culpability, combined with the view that the jury
in a rape case will usually favour the defendant. That is, the
Tasmanian Supreme Court feels guilty about the severity of the
objective test, and so gives the defendant every opportunity to use
it. The Canadian Supreme Court feels guilty about the scope and
power of the subjective test, and so restricts the ability of the
accused to use it. The common factor is the belief that the jury,
given half a chance, will acquit the accused. That belief is common
to those who espouse the objective test, for its greatest effect is the
transference of power from jury to judge.231
(c) The Role of the Jury
The theme that the jury will acquit the accused in a rape trial, given
even half a chance, is redolent in the literature, particularly among
those who would impose an objective standard of culpability on the
accused. Indeed, that is hardly surprising, given that a primary
function of objective tests and their more obvious evidentiary
equivalent is the transfer of decision-making power from the jury to
the judge. Some conclusions that the jury is biased against the
complainant are based on anecdotal evidence, 232 and some are
based on statistical study. 233 Despite fears of what might result if
decision-making power were consolidated in judicial hands in other
rape contexts, 23 4 there can be no doubt that judges impose artificial
and objective tests of liability in rape precisely because they, too,
230. 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 515.
231. Supra, note 86.
232. See, for example, Geis, Forcible Rape: An Introduction and Le Grand, Rape
and Rape Laws: Sexism In Society And Law in Chappell, Geis and Geis, supra,
note I at, respectively, 38 and 75; Coonan, Rape Law Reform - Proposals For
Reforming The Substantive Law in Scutt, supra, note I at 40-41.
233. Geis, id., at 37-38, citing Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury (Little
Brown, 1966). The most recent detailed research is that by Feild and Bienen,
Jurors And Rape (Lexington Books, 1980).
234. See, for example, Scutt, "Evidence And The Role of The Jury In Trials For
Rape", in Scutt, ed., supra, note 1 at 100-101.
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fear that the jury may unjustifiably acquit the accused rapist. 235
Thus, in Pappajohn, McIntyre J. presents the spectre of every jury
in a rape trial being charged on the subjective mental element of
rape as if this was a thing to be despised and avoided. 236 Why
should it be so, however, unless one cannot trust a jury to discern
the difference between an honest belief and one trumped-up to suit
the expediency of the moment? Dickson J. was right to quote Dixon
J., of the Australian High Court, as saying in this context that "..
a lack of confidence in the ability of a tribunal correctly to estimate
evidence of states of mind and the like can never be sufficient
ground for excluding from inquiry the most fundamental element in
a rational and humane criminal code." 2
37
Despite periodic reaffirmations of faith in the institution of the
jury to carry out the tasks entrusted to it, 238 many have serious
reservations with regard to the ability of the jury system, as it is
presently administered, to reach fair and just decisions in rape
cases. 239 Scutt concludes that:
Certainly if the jury is to be retained as a part of the criminal
justice system, then those who must become aware, as a top
priority, of the difficulties attaching to rape trials and the
prosecution of rape as an offence, are persons serving as jurors.
Part of the responsibility lies on counsel in rape trials to alert
members of the jury to their own prejudices. However the
ultimate responsibility lies upon a system seeking to retain the
jury, to meet with problems encountered in keeping "community
justice" in the courtroom. Where judges are required to adopt a
balanced approach to rape trials by following procedures
presently adhered to in other criminal trials and in addressing
prejudicial issues that may in the past have swayed their own
judgment, juries will be provided with a proper opportunity for
viewing the crime of rape, and the rape trial in proper context.
When the jury is to be the final arbiter, it must be given all
information appropriate to that decision: a recounting of the
235. See, for example, Cross, supra, note 17 at 546; Glanville Williams, supra,
note 161 at 254-255. Gordon, supra, note 85 at 370-371, exemplifies the fear. At
371, he states that "one of the problems of an excessively 'subjective' approach is
that it is likely to feed what I often fear is an unfounded conceit in our ability to
gauge a witness' truthfulness by his demeanour."
236. Pappajohn, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 514.
.237. Id., at 500, quoting Thomas, supra, note 51 at 309.
238. See, for example, Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 71; Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Report No. 16 (1982) at 5.
239. See, for example, the material cited in notes 232, 233, supra.
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nature of rape in its social setting would seem to be such
information .240
Juries represent, in a crude way, the attitudes of the community
from which they are drawn. If those attitudes mean that it will be
very difficult to obtain deserved rape convictions, then changing
those attitudes and the perceived self-interest of the average juror
24 1
are a far better way of solving the problem than creating artificial
laws of evidence and substance so that the jury may be more
effectively controlled or deprived of the power to perform its
function.
It has been suggested that one way of "educating" the jury is to
ensure that women have a more adequate representation on rape
juries. 24 2 These proposals have been accepted or rejected on the
assumption that the reform would make a difference to jury
decisions. For example, such a proposal was put to the Criminal
Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, and
was rejected because a study of the statistics in South Australia
revealed that there was no reason to conclude that women were
more likely to convict alleged rapists than were men. 2 43 It is
240. Scutt, supra, note 234 at 109.
241. See, for example, Clark and Lewis, supra, note 134 at 143-144.
242. See, for example, Heilbron, supra, note 13 at paras. 179-189; Report of the
Law Reform Commission (Tasmania, No. 3 of 1976), at 8-9; Mitchell Committee,
supra, note 27 at 53. It is commonly alleged that more women than men request
and are granted exemption from jury service, and that jury challenges are used to
eliminate women from rape juries.
243. Mitchell Committee, id., at 54, reports the following figures covering
1965-1975 in South Australia:
Majority female juries:









Juries of equal numbers:
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submitted that such a study should be done in Canada before similar
reform is suggested. In conclusion to the last three sections of this
article, it is submitted that Lord Simon was correctly left in dissent,
and that the majority decision in Pappajohn on the evidentiary bar
to denial of mens rea is equally wrong and should be discarded.
(d) Professor Fletcher's Analysis
Professor Fletcher uses Morgan to illustrate his own view of the
proper analysis of the elements of fault appropriate to particular
offences. In Rethinking Criminal Law, 24 4 Fletcher proposes a
distinction between matters of definition and matters of justifica-
tion. This distinction is set out in a series of premises:
1. The definition of an offence is the violation of a prohibitory
norm.
2. The prohibitory norm identifies the minimal set of-objective
circumstances necessary, in the given cultural context, to
state a coherent moral or social imperative.
3. There is no violation of a prohibitory norm unless the actor
acts intentionally or knowingly with respect to the elements
of the definition (the prohibitory norm) ....
4. Relevant mistakes about elements extrinsic to the definition
are excuses.
5. Elements of justification are extrinsic to the definition.
6. Excuses are not valid unless they negate the actor's
culpability
7. A mistake does not negate culpability unless the making of
the mistake was blameless.
245
According to this scheme of things, mistakes regarding elements of
the definition need only be honestly made, whereas mistakes
Total number of matters in which
there were verdicts: 87
Total not guilty 43
Total guilty 44
244. Supra, note 19.
245. Id., at 696-697. See also Smith, supra, note 204 at 433, where it is stated
that:
[l]f the mistake is made about a definitional element, it need not be reasonable
since it regards the violation of a prohibitory norm, whereas if it relates to a
matter of justification or excuse, it must be reasonable. An unreasonable
mistake is by definition culpable, and since attribution and culpability are
reciprocal, culpability can be attributed to a person who makes an unreasonable
mistake.
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regarding elements of justification must be reasonably made.
Hence, the question is whether the consent element of rape is a
matter of definition or justification. It should be obvious that this
question cannot be resolved simply by resorting to the legal
definitions. 246 Fletcher's view that the consent of rape is a matter of
justification is expressed as follows:
Intimate touching of the genitals is hardly routine; the touching
requires a good reason. The reason, or the justification, might be
the consent of the person touched or it might be the necessity of
performing an operation in an emergency situation. This seems to
me to be sufficient to regard the definition of rape as sexual
penetration, with consent functioning as a ground for regarding
the sexual act as a shared expression of love rather than as an
invasion of bodily integrity.247
It follows that the mistaken belief of the accused as to consent must
be reasonable in order to excuse. Fletcher expresses two doubts that
he has about this result. First, he points out that clear matters of
justification, such as self defence, are an exception to a prohibitory
norm, whereas consent is the normal case, rather than an exception.
Second, matters of justification usually represent reasons for the
inflication of harm, whereas consent shows that there was no harm
inflicted at all.
24 8
There are problems with the conceptual structure thus erected and
applied by Fletcher. These have been reviewed by Smith, and are
summarized in three criticisms, as follows. First, the analytical
apparatus does not reflect the questions which are at issue, such as
who we are trying to punish and why, in a way that is better than
any other, and, hence, it may dictate results that are at odds with a
given view on a question without reference to policies bearing on
that question. 249 Second, Fletcher himself admits that the crucial
distinction which he draws between definition and justification is
"suggestive, but at the same time problematic. ' 2 50 Third, in
admitting that the key distinction is imprecise, 25 1 Fletcher also
admits that it does lead to many cases, such as Morgan, in which the
246. Fletcher, id., at 702-703, criticizing the speech of Lord Hailsham in Morgan.
To do otherwise would be to sacrifice moral principle to the fortuity of a legislative
whim.
247. Ibid.
248. Id., at 707.
249. Smith, supra, note 204 at 433, 435.
250. Id., at 434.
251. Id., at 435.
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result is dictated from midair and is qualified by doubts which can
be resolved only by an unsubstantiated preference for one set of
doubts over another. 252 In addition, the doubts expressed by
Fletcher, which concern the result of applying the distinction to the
consent element in rape, are surely quite substantial. 253 These
difficulties with the theory become all too apparent when one
assesses the reasons why consent is held to be a matter of
justification, rather than a matter of definition. The reason seems to
be that sexual contact requires a good reason and that a good reason
is usually the consent of the other party. The problem with this is
that the inquiry is not into whether consent is definitional or
justificatory to sexual contact (it is obviously justificatory), but
whether consent is definitional or justificatory to rape. The
difference between the two concepts is that one is defined by the
lack of consent and the other is not, both as a matter of the social
concept as well as by the law. The fact that Fletcher has
concentrated on the wrong behaviour is demonstrated by the
consequences of the classification described as follows.
The search for definitional elements is the search for "the
minimal set of criteria that, in the given society, conveys a morally
significant prohibition" that is "necessary to incriminate the
actor.' 254 Thus, Fletcher has concluded that sexual intercourse is,
per se, an incriminating behaviour. This is a nonsense which
surfaced in an earlier part of this discussion and was rejected at that
stage. 255 But Fletcher does not resile from this position. He argues
that, because there is biblical evidence that it was better for a
woman to be raped than to consent to the sin of fornication, rape and
fornication are separate sins. 256 However, it is submitted that this
odd and oddly selective view of biblical sin hardly elicits the
incredulity with which one might treat the proposition that sexual
behaviour is, in general, worthy of moral condemnation. Fletcher
also argues that, even if consensual sexual acts are socially
acceptable, it does not follow that nonconsent is definitional
because arrest on the basis of probable cause is socially acceptable
and, yet, is a matter of justification. 257 But this is not to the point.
252. Id., at 436.
253. Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 707.
254. Smith, supra, note 204 at 435.
255. Supra, notes 139, 151.
256. Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 707.
257. Ibid.
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The question is not whether consensual sexual acts are socially
accepted, but whether sexual behaviour is, in general and without
further specification, subject to moral condemnation that is
sufficient to incriminate the actor. Moreover, an arrest example
provided is without content, for there has been no exact situation
provided. The matter of probable cause may or may not be
definitional if one considers that the policy officer in question has
been charged with an offence of (say) violation of a civil right. It is
submitted that Fletcher's analysis provides no reason for the
conclusion that the decision in Morgan was wrong.
(e) The Danger of Bogus Defence
Some of the adverse reactions to the decision in Morgan were
grounded on the view that, as a result of that decision, all an
accused had to do to escape conviction for rape was to spin some
tale of belief in consent. 2 58 There are a number of responses to this
fear. First, the argument brings us back to the old point that mistrust
of the good sense of juries is not a defensible basis for the alteration
or construction of substantial doctrine. 25 9 There is nothing
demonstrably special about the crime of rape that warrants departure
from this sensible observation. 26 0 If the credulous jury is the
problem, then it is best to attack the matter directly, particularly
when the shotgun approach does not distinguish between the
meretricious and the meritorious. 2 61 Second, an experienced policy
surgeon in the Australian State of Victoria who, for some
unspecificed reason, espouses the objective position, admits that
Victoria has managed the subjective position for thirty-five years
without a single cause celebre to give any critic pause. 262 Third, it
should be clear by now that there is very little difference in practice
258. See, for example, such fears reported by Glanville Williams, supra, note 15
at 101: Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 69: Note, supra, note 100 at 206:
Williams, CriminalLaw in Baxt, ed., Annual Survey (Law Book Co., 1981) at 1-2.
259. See, supra, notes 232-237.
260. See, for example, similar comment by Fletcher, supra, note 19 at 699;
Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 101: Heilbron, supra, note 13 at paras.
69-73: Smith, The Heilbron Report [1976] Crim. L.R. 97 at 99: Pappajohn, 52
C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 500: -'it will be a rare day when a jury is satisfied as to the
existence of an unreasonable belief."
261. Glanville Williams, supra, note 161 at 338, col. 1, asked, " [d]o the judges
believe that the importance of convicting unmeritorious people outweighs the
importance of acquitting meritorious ones?"
262. Bush, Rape in Australia (Sun Books, 1977) at 95-96.
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between the objective and the subjective positions. The subjective
orthodoxy is bent very nicely in hard cases, as has been seen above,
by the manipulation of the rules that govern what evidence may go
to the jury, by fudging of the definition of such subjectivist terms as
"recklessness" and "wilful blindness", by direction to the jury
regarding the credibility of bald assertions of belief in consent, by
the fact that the evidential burden of persuasion is on the accused,
and by other procedures. Pickard expresses astonishment that the
Supreme Court of Canada and the House of Lords should have
chosen cases in which the resolution of the problem did not bear
directly upon the result of the case to expound their preferred
solution to "this conceptually intractable and politically sensitive
issue." 26 3 The answer is surely obvious. Juries must be directed, no
matter how much Pickard would like the issue to remain open.
There must be a reason why the law of rape has only recently
thrown this problem into such stark relief in such indirect cases.
Perhaps the direct cases are so rare and are so easily solved by the
jury that they do not go beyond conviction. Perhaps the system is
working. Or perhaps the appellate courts were tired of waiting for
the nonexistent, and, like the Pappajohn court, finally seized a good
opportunity to deal with academic disputation which could only
unduly complicate the proper jury instruction. 26 4 Fourth, it must be
realized that our hypothetical accused treads an impossible tightrope
which may explain the rarity of the direct case. The Heilbron
Committee remarks of the "defence" of mistaken belief in consent
that:
In many cases this "defence" would be a "desperate defence" to
advance. This is particularly so when the signs of lack of consent
are obvious, as when it is established that the man has used
violence or threats of violence, or has been armed with a weapon.
Furthermore, it will usually be extremely difficult for the accused
to contend that he genuinely believed that the victim consented,
without also contending that she did in fact consent, and saying
so, for example, in any statement he makes to the police. Once
263. Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn (1980),
30 U.T.L.J. 415 at 415, n.3.
264. Pappajohn, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 499 (Dickson J., dissenting): "The
ongoing debate in the Courts and learned journals as to whether mistake must be
reasonable is conceptually important in the orderly development of the criminal
law, but in my view, practically unimportant because the accused's statement that
he was mistaken is not likely to be believed unless the mistake is, to the jury,
reasonable."
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the jury has reached the conclusion that she did not consent, the
accused will normally appear a liar, and his claim that he
nevertheless believed in consent is likely to be rejected. We
appreciate that in very exceptional circumstances the accused
may succeed in treading what amounts to a tightrope; what we
doubt is whether such cases will occur at all frequently.
26 5
The two matters raised in this explanation of the "tightrope"
defence are worthy of additional comment. First, the general
practical incompatibility between the more usual plea of "she
consented" and the plea "I thought that she was consenting" is
recognizable here without succumbing to the temptation displayed
by McIntyre J. to turn it into a legal rule and, thereby, defeat the
jury process that is bound to catch the accused. Second, it is
interesting to note that in the absence of the most compelling
evidence, the accused who uses force, threats, or a weapon cannot
succeed with a plea of mistaken belief unless the mistake is more
than reasonable. Given the research which indicates that a very high
proportion of rapes are accompanied by force, threats, or a weapon,
this fact may explain the rarity of the mistaken belief case which
amounts to more than a plea of desperation and is treated as such. 
2 66
The most obvious answer to the bogus defence argument is that
the rule in law that the belief of the accused need not be shown to be
reasonable in order to excuse him or her does not mean that the
reasonableness of the belief is irrelevant to the case. On the
contrary, the reasonableness of the belief is very cogent evidence
that is to be put to the jury so that it may determine whether or not
the belief was actually held. The more unreasonable the belief,
then, in the absence of special circumstances, the more unlikely it is
that the jury will credit the story of the accused. 267 Dahlitz has
attempted to argue the converse, namely, that if reasonableness is a
requirement, then an honest belief would be cogent evidence that
the belief was reasonable. 268 That, however, is surely nonsense, is
not to the point of the legal tests involved, and misses the point that
265. Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 69. See also Glanville Williams, supra,
note 15 at 103 and Cross, supra, note 17 at 552.
266. See, for example, Brownmiller, supra, note 3 at 184: Clark and Lewis,
supra, note 135 at 66 Le Grand, supra, note I at 68: Mitchell, supra, note 27 at 6.
267. This point is made by most commentators. Examples are: Glanville Williams,
supra, note 15 at 99; Toner, supra, note 4 at 137: Howard, supra, note 19 at 372;
Gordon, supra, note 85 at 368 Note, supra, note 100 at 206: Stuart, Criminal Law
and Procedure (1977), 9 Ottawa L.R. 568 at 580: Wells, supra, note 152 at 212;
Cowley, supra, note 183 at 207.
268. Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 17.
The Rapist's Charter 517
one test is more exacting than the other. Again, the issue comes
back to the necessary faith in the decision-making powers of the
jury as constrained by the twists and turns of the flexible legal
doctrines explained to them by the judge.
The hard case is not the bogus defence at all. The hard case is the
most genuine of defences. It is put most eloquently by Bienen, who
says "take, for example, a defendant who says, "I always beat up
my partners. They always protest a little. Most women are
masochists. Of course I had never met this one before, but they all
really love it in spite of the broken noses and bruises. For me sex
and violence go together. And this one didn't love it. That's my
mistake." ' 2 69 Leaving aside the admission by Bienen that juries
reject this sort of evidence because of its inherent implausibility, let
this view be considered on its so-called merits. Let it be supposed
that this is an honest belief. What, then, is to be done? Clearly, the
answer is surely that the belief is hardly to the point. The fact that
one entertains a belief about women generally and in all
circumstances is not conclusive as to one's belief about the woman
in question. 27 0 The sadist's belief is a general belief, and is
completely equivocal concerning the crucial question, "what was his
belief concerning this victim, at this time?" If it is an insane belief,
then regardless of what defensible insanity rules apply, the
question of pure mistake is precluded. More importantly, it is
impossible to believe that a properly directed jury could not find
such an accused reckless. 27 ' The answer to the argument based on
the bogus defence, or, indeed, on the honest defence of the sadist, is
that it overlooks the function and operation of the tribunal of fact in
rape cases. Moreover, it overlooks the variety of legal techniques
developed in order to deny just such a bad excuse. Foremost among
these is the burgeoning concept of recklessness. Thus, it is
submitted that there is, in the objectivist arguments discussed
269. Bienen, Mistakes (1978), 7 Philosophy & Public Affairs 224 at 239, citing a
silly comment to the same effect from Comment, Forcible And Statutory, Rape: An
Exploration of The Operation and Objectives of The Consent Standard (1952), 62
Yale L.J. at 66-68.
270. However, a belief in the behaviour of a specific woman in closely confined
repetitious circumstances very well may be conclusive: see Mayer v. Marchant,
siqpra, note 58, quoted, supra, note 73.
271. See, for example, Colvin, supra, note 82 at 359, where it is said that: "The
accused cannot simply rely on his own peculiar notions of the sexuality of women.
There must be credible evidence of failure to appreciate the ordinary
understandings of protest and resistance. The tactical burden will be very difficult
to overcome without an assertion of deficient mental capacity (emphasis added)."
518 The Dalhousie Law Journal
above, no sound basis for the position that the decision in Morgan
was incorrect in law, logic, or policy.
Two other matters require brief mention. First, Bienen argues
against the principle of subjective culpability on the ground that it
provides the defence with an additional bargaining tool in the plea
bargaining process. 27 2 That may well be so, but the argument is
more relevant to the issue of plea bargaining than it is to the mental
element of rape. If all issues were to be decided on that basis, then
the proof of all crimes would be complete on proof of actus reus.
Bienen, among others, has also pointed out that concentration on
the mental element of the accused may well subvert the intention of
statutes that have recently been enacted and which limit the
introduction of "chastity" and "reputation" evidence. 2 73 That may
be regrettable, but is hardly a reason for the limitation of mens
rea. 2 7 4 Such evidentiary legislation is usually parasitic on legal
relevance, and not the other way around. If the belief of the accused
is relevant, then he should be allowed to show the reasons for that
belief in accordance with the normal rules of evidence regarding
relevance and prejudice. Moreover, even if what was required was
reasonable belief, the evidence would be equally relevant. It is now,
however, sufficient to simply demolish any argument that favours
the objectivist position. It is also necessary to develop some reasons
which may show that Morgan was right, and it is to the defence of
what has been derided as "subjective orthodoxy ' 27 5 of "the
subjective bug" 2 76 that discussion now turns.
VI. For Subjectivism
The primitive English legal system did not openly distinguish
between harm inflicted purposely and harm inflicted by accident.
2 77
272. Bienen, supra, note 269 at 233-234.
273. Bienen, id., at 232-233. See also Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 17; O'Grady and
Powell, "Rape Victims in Court - The South Australian Experience", in Scutt,
ed., supra, note I at 130, 131, 134.
274. Contra Mitchell, supra, note 27 at 30, where it is stated that [filt is likely to
be very material to the issue of consent of the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse or
the accused's belief in such consent that the parties have previously indulged in
consensual sexual intercourse."
275. See, for example, Pickard, supra, note 263 at 420 n.20. An odd footnote.
276. Wells, supra, note 152 at 210 n.8, citing Cross, supra, note 17 at 551.
277. See, for example, Hogan, Crime, Punishment and Responsibility (1978), 24
Villanova L.R. 690 at 691-692: "A man was thought to be responsible simply
because he had caused the harm. At a more primitive stage of legal development,
beasts which had caused harm might be put to death and such irrational notion of
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The evolution of the notion of fault has been traced by many, and
was recently summarized by the Law Reform Commission of
Canada. 27 8 The notion is interwoven with questions regarding
moral culpability, political power, and the primacy of vengeance in
any given society. The commission notes that, by the time of the
classic English text writers, liability on the basis of personal fault
was espoused and applied, 27 9 but the growth of the positivist
movement in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
produced, again, a concentration on the causation of harm at the
expense of the moral fault of the actor. This movement, inter alia,
resulted in the creation of offences of absolutely liability, and the
reaction thereto produced the compromise of the defence of
reasonable mistaken of fact. 280 That ideological conflict, in turn,
produced defences of subjective culpability. The case has already
been made, as follows:
Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however
distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. It can hardly go
very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a
dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked.
2 81
Even if one is skeptical of psychiatric theories of the enduring,
pervasive effect of the conditions of infancy, one may doubt
whether the failure to acquire normal skill is a moral fault with
which criminal law may be properly concerned . ..Indeed, it
may be doubted whether it is within any human competence to
appraise this sort of assumed immorality - the accumulation of
countless faults from childhood to the instant damage - in
quantitative terms of specific penalties .. .Calloused character
cannot be identified or equated with voluntary misconduct.
Moreover, negligently caused damaged, unlike voluntary
harmdoing, does not challenge the community's values as
expressed in the penal law.
28 2
responsibility' must have contributed to the rules of deodand whereby any chattel,
animate or inanimate, which caused harm was forfeit."
278. See The Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper No. 29,
Criminal Law: the general part - liability and defence( 1982), at 166-169.
279. See, for example, the early literature quoted by O'Connor, supra, note 206 at
644-645.
280. See, supra, notes 50-53.
281. Holmes, The Common Law (1881) at 6-7. See also Allen, Criminal Law and
the Modern Consciousness: Some Observations on Blameworthiness (1977), 44
Tenn. L.R. 735 at 749, 761-762; Hogan, supra, note 277 at 702.
282. Hall, supra, note 155 at 636-637. See also Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in
Criminal Law (1957), 33 Ind. L.J. I at 3, where it is said that: "To understanding
the rationale of ignorantia facti excusat, it is necessary to recognize and take
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The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A
relation between some mental element and punishment for a
harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar
exculpatory "but I didn't mean to".
28 3
The notion that a Court should not find a person guilty of an
offence against the criminal law unless he has a blameworthy
state of mind is common to all civilized penal systems. It is
founded upon respect for the person and for the freedom of
human will. A person is accountable for what he wills . . . to be
criminal, the wrong doing must have been consciously
committed. 2
4
Glanville Williams, Jerome Hall, Herbert Packer, Colin Howard,
and H.L.A. Hart, 285 among others, have made a cogent case for the
position that punishment on the basis of subjective mens rea only
shall be the fundamental principle of the criminal law, with as few
jealously guarded exceptions as possible; their work cannot simply
be dismissed as "subjectivist orthodoxy". The following is an
attempt to highlight the strengths of the subjectivist position. First,
it is difficult to justify punishment, of those who transgress under
the influence of a mistaken view of the situation, by the use of the
notions of deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and intimidation.
Second, it may be argued that such punishment is not in accord with
commonly held views of moral responsibility, and so offends
against the standards of the general community which the law, at
least in part, is supposed to represent. Third, punishment for the
negligent commission of a major crime in the absence of legislative
proscription may well offend against the constitutional division of
powers in Canada. 28 6 Fourth, punishment for negligence is a blunt
account of the relevant ethical principle, namely, moral obligation is determined
not by the actual facts but by the actor's opinion regarding them."
283. Morrissette v. U.S. (1952), 342 U.S. 246 at 251-252.
284. Leary, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473 at 486, (Dickson J.). See also Howard, supra,
note 19 at 361-362 and Heilbron, supra, note 13 at paras. 74-76.
285. Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea And Criminal Responsibility", in Guest, ed.,
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (0. U. P., 1961) at 29.
286. An Australian should be the last to buy into this dispute: I refer merely to R.
v. Prue & Baril, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547 at 548, 46 C.C.C. (2d) 257, 8 C.R. (3d) 68,
96, D.L.R. 577, [1979] 4 W.W.R. 554, where it is stated that: "There must be a
substantive non-geographical basis for federal legislation, and where the criminal
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weapon indeed for the education of a recalcitrant public and the
furtherance of defensible social policy. Fifth, in the specific context
of rape, punishment for negligence would mean the exclusive
concentration of the law on the mental freedom of one party to a
transaction, to the exclusion of the mental autonomy of the other.
28 7
Sixth, and perhaps most important, there is a distressing tendency to
regard justice for the individual and justice for society as
antithetical. 2 88 This is nonsense. The truth of the matter is that
undeserved punishment for a major crime is unfair and unjust to all.
It is particularly unjust to the person accused, for it deprives him or
her of the chance to behave in accordance with the law.
The persuasive force of the "subjectivist orthodoxy" is shown in
its endorsement by both the English Law Commission and the Law
Reform Commission of Canada. The latter body has stated that:
In previous papers we argued for the retention of responsibility.
We did so on three grounds - liberty, justice and humanity.
First, the doctrine of mens rea maximizes liberty: given a
requirement of mens rea, the individual knows he is secure unless
he breaks the law deliberately, and so can plan his life
accordingly. Second, it maximizes justice: historically our law
has always been to some extent concerned with doing justice,
justice bases liability on fault, and mens rea articulates that basis.
Third, the doctrine satisfies requirements of humanity: it makes
the criminal law treat persons as persons, i.e. creatures to be
reasoned with and called upon to answer for their actions. 2 89
Two strands of these arguments for the strength of the subjectivist
position bear some further emphasis. First, it is important to remember
that the discussion concerns a very serious offence indeed, one which
is punishable by life imprisonment and which has, in the past, attracted
the death penalty. The imposition of liability for failure to comport
with the standards of the reasonable person is almost invariably limited
to offences which are not punishable by imprisonment at all, let alone
imprisonment for life. Moreover, punishment on the basis of
negligence is almost invariably confined to those offences which do
law is considered, and especially where an offence is included in the Criminal
Code, it is generally found in a requirement of proof of mens rea."
287. See Note, supra, note 2 at 456-457.
288. A most distressing example occurs in Wells, supra, note 152 at 211, in which
the interests of justice and the interests of the accused are regarded as antithetical.
Mitchell, supra, note 27 at 7-8, comments that the contest is not one between the
accused and the "prosecutrix", but between the accused and the requirements of
the law.
289. Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, note 278 at 170-171.
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not carry great moral and social opprobrium; 290 rape, in contrast to
this, is an offence of great moral and social stigma. Both of these
practices are designed to reduce to a minimum the number of persons
who may be described as the luckless victims of the furtherance of the
implicit legislative policy. Rape isan offence which is noteven close to
being a marginal case, despite the reality of sentencing practice.
29 '
Clark and Lewis submit that rape is not treated as a serious crime in
Canadian society. Their claim is based on figures showing an average
sentence for those convicted of rape of four to seven years in prison and
an average practical serving time of eighteen to twenty-four months,
roughly equivalent to the figures for robbery. 292 However, robbery is
seen as a serious crime, and the average sentence for it is still a not
inconsiderable term in prison. If the penalties for rape showed a rough
equivalence to the penalties presently, and inadequately, meted out to
those who manufacture dangerous goods or poison the environment,
then their argument might be on safer ground.
If it is conceded, as it must be, that the sentencing practice for
rape is not out of proportion to the severity of the crime, it does not
necessarily follow that the negligent rapist does not deserve the
attention of the criminal justice system at all. An offence of
"negligent rape" has been mooted, 29 3 and those on both sides of
the issue have rejected it. The Criminal Law and Penal Methods
Reform Committee of South Australia rejected it on the ground that
290. See, for example, the extensive discussion by Hutchinson, supra, note 41.
There is extensive authority for this proposition. See, for example, Saulte Ste.
Marie, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 at 362-365, in which Dickson J. uses various terms,
with "'public welfare offence" predominating, in contrast to offences described as
"true criminal offences". A major common law exception is involuntary
manslaughter, but offences of homicide are always exceptional.
291. See, for example, Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 61; Mitchell, supra, note
27 at 6-7; Sellers, supra, note 18 at 247; Cross, supra, note 17 at 552: "[O]ne
reason why the maximum punishment for rape is life imprisonment is that the
common man considers rapists to be very wicked people. Someone who believes,
albeit without reasonable cause, that the woman is consenting may well be stupid
and insensitive, but he is not wicked in the sense in which the rapist is wicked."
For social attitudes to rape, see Akman and Normandeau, The Measurement of
Crime and Delinquency in Canada (1967), 7 Br. J. Criminal. 129; Kvalseth,
Seriousness of Offences (1980), 18 Criminology 237.
292. Clark and Lewis, supra, note 134 at 56-57.
293. See, for example, Dahlitz, supra, note 4 at 38; Watson, "Reform of the Law
of the Australian Capital Territory Relating To Rape And Other Sexual Offences",
in Scutt, ed., supra, note I at 71; Cross, supra, note 17 at 552-553; Note, supra,
note 86 at 437.
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no penalty should be imposed in such a situation, 294 and at the other
extreme, Temkin rejected it because it would derogate from the
freedom of women to exist without fear of rape; it would condone
the rapist and negate the right of females to have sexual
autonomy. 295 The Heilbron Committee rejected such an offence, in
part because they thought that it would unduly complicate the jury
trial, 296 and Wells rejected it, in part because she could not see the
rationality of a distinction between reckless and negligent rape if
there is no distinction between reckless and intentional rape.
297
None of these reasons seem particularly persuasive in the absence of
further specification and analysis. The more persuasive reasons
focus on the predicted reaction of the jury. It can be argued cogently
that the jury may well be tempted to use the new offence, in an
overweening number of cases, as a catchall for those that are too
hard. Thus, the Heilbron Committee felt that the compromise
offence would be used for cases of doubt and/or sympathy, thereby
rendering the just verdict even more difficult to come by. 298 Wells
agreed, adding that the effect could be the perpetuation of double
standards through the classification of the offence by the
classification of the type of victim. 299 Here too, however, there is a
distrust of the jury, and it must be realized that the argument is
speculative in the extreme. All things considered, the case for the
lesser offence is far from closed. The second point regarding the
strength of the subjectivist position lies in the nature of the injustice
alleged to occur in the punishment for unreasonable mistake, for
who is the accused who will make a mistake which is totally
unreasonable? The cause of the belief in consent is all important. If
the cause is insanity or drunkenness, then the excuse is confined to
the legal doctrines apposite to those excuses, and whether or not the
appropriate legal doctrine is defensible is not the concern of this
discussion.
There has been some discussion, in the context of the range and
definition of the concept of recklessness, of the accused who acts in
a fit of temper, without thinking of the risk of his or her behaviour,
294. Mitchell, supra, note 27 at 8-9.
295. Temkin,supra, note I at 418-419.
296. Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 79.
297. Wells, supra, note 152 at 213.
298. Heilbron, supra, note 13 at para. 79.
299. Wells, supra, note 152 at 212.
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or of anything else, for that matter. 300 But that is not the hard case.
The hard case is the one in which the final decision is that either the
accused did not live up to the standard which the jury expects from
the reasonable person, and did so for some reason which might as
well be called stupidity as anything else, or the accused is telling the
jury a pack of lies. The members of the jury, of course, must decide
between the two alternatives, but what if they opt for a reasonable
doubt on the former - that is, they decide that the accused did not
know that the other did not consent, but there is no reason for that
belief? It seems silly and pointless to punish a person for being less
than a jury would wish him or her to be. Hall stated that:
To declare that a person had the competence to be sensitive to
ordinary dangers is a tautology, since competence is or includes
that quality. In other terms, is one to be blamed because one is
not normally sensitive to ordinary danger or to a duty to attend to
such danger? The statement of the issue, in terms relevant to
penal liability, also reveals the superficiality of determining this
difficult factual problem in a courtroom. For, as regards the
determination of the sensitivity to social values and the
possibility of danger, a quick glance at the education, vocation,
and mentality of the negligent person leads only to guesswork.
The result is strict penal liability, not punishment based on
fault.301
This is hardly a new problem in the operation of the criminal law,
particularly in the context of the application of an objective element
in true defences for criminal offences, such as self defence,
provocation, and duress. Pickard, in her espousal of some kind of
objective element in the assessment of culpability in rape,
acknowledges the force of the problem, and concludes that:
The appropriate way to handle this kind of unfairness is to modify
the traditional measure of reasonableness. It is entirely possible
to take the relevant characteristics of the particular actor, rather
than those of the ordinary person as the background against
which to measure the reasonableness of certain conduct or
beliefs. The fact finder must ask whether or not the belief was
reasonably arrived at in the circumstances, given those attitudes
300. See, for example, discussion of Parker, supra, note 162 by Glanville
Williams, supra, note 15 at 77-80; Colvin, supra, note 82 at 364; Syrota, supra,
note 161 at 100.
301. Hall, supra, note 155 at 640. Accord: Glanville Williams, id., at 46-47;
Brinnig, The Mistake of Fact Defense And The Reasonableness Requirement
(1978), 2 Geo. Mason L.R. 209 at 216-217; Hogan, supra, note 277 at 694;
McEwan and Robilliard, supra, note 95 at 283; Colvin, supra, note 82 at 368.
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and capabilities of the defendant which he cannot be expected to
control . . . this individualized standard is neither "subjective"
nor "objective". It partakes of the subjective position because
the inquiry the factfinder must conduct is about the defendant
himself, not about some hypothetical ordinary person. It partakes
of the objective position because the inquiry is not limited to what
was, in fact, in the actor's mind but includes an inquiry into what
could have been in it, and a judgment about what ought to have
been in it.
30 2
This concession finishes the objective position utterly, and is
without any principle at all. If it has any meaning, it means that the
jury is to be told that, if the accused is, in its opinion, guilty, then it
should rationalize the situation as it will - he either knew or he
ought to have known, and it does not matter which. If this is to be
taken seriously, how then is anyone to distinguish the objective
from the subjective test? That task is difficult enough in the context
of the present interpretation of the concept of recklessness, but the
discussion above has attempted to limit recklessness to a viable
subjective concept, free of the more masochistic judicial tendencies
to conflate recklessness and negligence. This must be something
different, but what? The only analogous guide is the one cited by
Pickard, namely, recent developments of the defence of provoca-
tion. In Camplin, 30 3 the House of Lords took an orthodox subjective
position with respect to the objective component of the defence of
provocation, and held that the ordinary reasonable person is to be
given all the idiosyncracies of the accused in the evaluation of what
his or her reaction ought to have been in all the circumstances of the
individual case. How, then, does the reaction of the
ordinary/reasonable person differ from the reaction of the accused?
The answer, to date, has been that the former is sober and of
reasonable temper.3 0 4 The reason for the exclusion of the drunken
reaction to provocation should be obvious to those who have
followed the tortuous paths trodden by the judiciary in the rejection
of the effects of alcohol as an excuse for anything. 30 5 The rationale
302. Pickard, supra, note 17 at 79.
303. [1978] A.C. 705. See alsoRowen, [1982] Crim. L.R. 51.
304. As to drunkenness, see Wright [1969] S.C.R. 335; Perrault [1971] S.C.R.
196; Croft (1981), 3 A. Crim. R. 307, (N.S.W.C.A.); O'Neill (1981), 4 A. Crim.
R. 404, (V.C.A.). As to short temper, see Mancini [1942] A.CI.; Moffa (1977),
13 A.L.R. 225, (H.C.); Griffin (1980), 23 S.A.S.R. 264, 2 A. Crim. R. 80.
305. D.P.P. v. Majewski, [1977] A.C. 443;Leary (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473 37
C.R.N.S. 60, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 103, (S.C.C.).
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for the exclusion of the idiosyncracy of short temper is equally
simple: to do otherwise would be to convert murder to manslaughter
in any case in which the homicide was not planned or deemed by
law. The exception of provocation would effectively swallow the
rule. 30 6 The matter is easily tested. It is generally agreed that, where
an accused has an abnormal sensitivity about his impotence, if such
a thing is possible, the ordinary man should share that characteristic
for the purposes of the law of provocation, and that Bedder contra
should not be followed. 30 7 What is the difference between Mr.
Bedder and the man who has abnormal beliefs about the generality
of masochism among women? What is the difference between the
objective and subjective positions if Pickard's formula is adopted,
and what is the distinction between her position and a reasoned
formulation of recklessness? It is submitted that any distinctions are
purely arbitrary. The strength of the case for the subjective view is
confirmed, rather than weakened, by this concession.
VII. Conclusion
There is no rapist's charter. The arguments in favour of an objective
standard of liability for the consent element of rape are not
convincing, and the arguments in favour of the restriction of
liability to those who are aware that the other is not consenting are
overwhelming. Present law, which, at the very least, subscribes in
theory to the subjectivist orthodoxy, tends to distort the background
theory to convict those who are perceived to be culpable, even if
their cases lie in the border of reasonable doubt. The key to the state
of the present law lies in a settled definition and a principled and
reasoned application of the law of the developing concept of
recklessness. That millenium has yet to be achieved. The positivists
who would focus the almost exclusive concern of the criminal law
upon the harm inflicted upon the person who has been subjected to
sexual intercourse without giving consent would do well to examine
the law on recklessness to see whether or not it is capable of
conferring guilt upon those who truly deserve it, and whether or not
306. See Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 492, where he says that "the test of
the reasonable man refers to the mental quality of normal self-control, not to
physical characteristics."
307. Bedder [1954] 1 WL.R. 1119, (H.L.). Glanville Williams, for example,
submits that the case should no longer be followed, supra, note 15 at 492, and it is
doubtful whether the decision has survived Camplin, supra, note 304.
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it is capable of removing from the prison system those who do not
deserve that ultimate retribution.
The dispute about culpability is really a dispute about what the
law should require of men and women in their various sexual
contacts, from traditional marital sexual relationships to so-called
one-night stands. The regulation of sexual behaviour in the marginal
cases, conditioned as it is by far more influential factors than the
criminal law, is a minefield for those who would achieve social
education by proscription. Moreover, the formulation of rules to
deal with the almost infinite variety of human sexual experience is a
task which requires far more than the espousal of such inflexible and
insensitive requirements as the proposed requirement of advertence.
Such requirements must balance the harm inflicted by nonconsen-
sual sexual contact with the implementation of social policy that
recognizes the absurdity of imposing rules of action that are at odds
with the realities of human sexual behaviour in Canadian society.
The formulation of rules of action in the criminal law of rape must
make explicit what behaviour is considered intolerable, without
attacking radically those views commonly held about what is and
what is not accepted in the wide variety of possible situations.
Whether the test for culpability is objective (what we would expect
of ourselves) or subjective (what we would expect of the accused),
in practice the law will reflect, in a rough way, the attitudes and
beliefs of the society in which it operates; changing the rules is a
very blunt and ineffective way of changing those attitudes, even if
they are thought to be unacceptable. What is required is the exercise
of formulating the rules of action, both as they are and as they
should be; that exercise would begin the process of public education
which is necessary for the creation of effective and defensible rape
law.
